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Abstract
We consider joint optimization of artificial noise (AN) and information signals in a MIMO wiretap interference
network, wherein the transmission of each link may be overheard by several MIMO-capable eavesdroppers. Each
information signal is accompanied with AN, generated by the same user to confuse nearby eavesdroppers. Using a
noncooperative game, a distributed optimization mechanism is proposed to maximize the secrecy rate of each
link. The decision variables here are the covariance matrices for the information signals and ANs. However,
the nonconvexity of each link’s optimization problem (i.e., best response) makes conventional convex games
inapplicable, even to find whether a Nash Equilibrium (NE) exists. To tackle this issue, we analyze the proposed
game using a relaxed equilibrium concept, called quasi-Nash equilibrium (QNE). Under a constraint qualification
condition for each player’s problem, the set of QNEs includes the NE of the proposed game. We also derive the
conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the resulting QNE. It turns out that the uniqueness conditions are too
restrictive, and do not always hold in typical network scenarios. Thus, the proposed game often has multiple QNEs,
and convergence to a QNE is not always guaranteed. To overcome these issues, we modify the utility functions of
the players by adding several specific terms to each utility function. The modified game converges to a QNE even
when multiple QNEs exist. Furthermore, players have the ability to select a desired QNE that optimizes a given
social objective (e.g., sum-rate or secrecy sum-rate). Depending on the chosen objective, the amount of signaling
overhead as well as the performance of resulting QNE can be controlled. Simulations show that not only we can
guarantee the convergence to a QNE, but also due to the QNE selection mechanism, we can achieve a significant
improvement in terms of secrecy sum-rate and power efficiency, especially in dense networks.
Index Terms
Wiretap interference network, friendly jamming, quasi-Nash equilibrium, NE selection, nonconvex games.
I. INTRODUCTION
PHYSICAL-layer (PHY-layer) security provides a cost-efficient alternative to cryptographic methodsin scenarios where the use of the latter is either impractical or expensive. One of the common settings
for PHY-layer security is the wiretap channel. In this channel, a node (Alice) wishes to transmit messages
securely to a legitimate receiver (Bob) in the presence of one or more eavesdroppers (Eve). Most PHY-layer
security techniques for the wiretap channel are based on an information-theoretic definition of security,
namely, the secrecy capacity, defined as the largest amount of information that can be confidentially
communicated between Alice and Bob [1].
Over the last decade, several PHY-layer security techniques have been proposed. Some of these tech-
niques rely on the use of artificial noise (AN) as a friendly jamming (FJ) signal [2]. In this method,
Alice uses multiple antennas to generate an FJ signal along with the information signal, increasing the
interference at Eve but without affecting Bob. The authors in [2] proposed a simple version of this
technique, which relies on MIMO zero-forcing to ensure that the FJ signal falls in the null-space of
the channel between Alice and Bob. The interest in using AN for a single link is driven by pragmatic
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considerations, and not necessarily due to its optimality. In fact, it was shown in [3] that in one-Eve
scenario, the optimal approach for securing a single link with the knowledge of Eve’s location is not
to use AN. Complementing the classic AN approach in [2], which relies on transmitting the AN in the
null-space of the legitimate channel, it was shown in [4] that adding AN to both the legitimate channel
and its null-space can further improve the secrecy rate of a link. In the case of multiple eavesdroppers,
it was shown in [5] that the use of AN can significantly improve the secrecy rate compared to the case
when AN is not used.
In a multi-link scenario, where several transmitters wish to convey their messages simultaneously to
several legitimate receivers (see Fig. 1), the FJ signal of each transmitter must be designed to not interfere
with other unintended (but legitimate) receivers in the network. This can be quite challenging when only
limited or no coordination is possible between links. Therefore, providing PHY-layer secrecy has to be
done in a distributed yet noninterfering manner. Interference management for PHY-layer security involves
two conflicting factors. On the one hand, the AN from one transmitter degrades the respective information
signals at unintended (but legitimate) receivers. On the other hand, AN also increases the interference
at eavesdroppers, and is hence useful in terms of improving the security of the communications. The
idea of using interference in networks to provide secrecy was first discussed in [6]. Several subsequent
works exploited this idea in other applications, such as the coexistence of different protocols on the same
channel. For instance, the authors in [7] considered a two-link SISO interference network, which resembles
a coexistence scenario. They showed that with a careful power control design for both links, one link can
assist the other in providing a rate demand guarantee as well as secure the transmission by increasing
interference on a single-antenna eavesdropper. For the case of two transmitter-receiver-eavesdropper triples,
the authors in [8] proposed a cooperative beamforming approach to achieve maximum secure degree
of freedom for both users. In fact, given the knowledge of co-channel interference at the receivers, a
cooperative transmission alignment scheme between transmitters is established such that their respective
receivers will get interference-free signals and the eavesdropper corresponding to each link will receive
interference.
In this paper, we consider a peer-to-peer multi-link interference network in which the transmission on
each link can be overheard by several external eavesdroppers. Perhaps the closest works to our scenario are
[7] and [8]. Apart from the fact that both of these works consider only a two-user scenario, which limits
their applicability, in [7] one of the users generates only interference to provide PHY-layer security for
the other user, so providing the PHY-layer secrecy of the former user is overlooked. In contrast, our work
provides PHY-layer security for all users. Moreover, although the work in [8] considers providing secrecy
for both users (in a slightly different network than the one we consider), it requires a significant amount
of signaling (i.e., coordination) between the two users. In this paper, we limit the amount of coordination
as much as possible.
In our system model, we assume that the transmission of each information signal is accompanied with
AN. Each node in the network is equipped with multiple antennas. Our goal is to design a framework
through which the co-channel interference at each legitimate receiver is minimized while the aggregate
interference at external eavesdroppers remains high. Because nodes cannot cooperate with each other in our
settings, each link independently tries to maximize its secrecy rate by designing the covariance matrices
(essentially, the precoders) of its information signal and AN. This independent secrecy optimization can be
modeled via noncooperative game theory. Specifically, we design a game-theoretic framework in which the
utility of each player (i.e., link) is his secrecy rate, and the player’s strategy is to optimize the covariance
matrices of information signal and AN. It turns out that finding the best response of each link requires
solving a nonconvex optimization problem. Thus, the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) cannot be
proved using traditional concepts of convex (concave) games [9]. Instead, we study the proposed game
based on a relaxed equilibrium concept called quasi-Nash equilibrium (QNE) [10]. A QNE is a solution of
a variational inequality (VI) [11] obtained under the K.K.T optimality conditions of the players’ problems.
We show that under a constraint qualification (CQ) condition for each player’s problem, the set of QNEs
also includes the NE. Sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the resulting QNE are
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provided. Then, an iterative algorithm is proposed to achieve the unique QNE.
Despite their attractiveness in terms of not requiring link coordination, the (Q)NEs of a purely non-
cooperative game are often inefficient in terms of the achievable sum-utility (i.e., secrecy sum-rate).
Furthermore, the conditions that guarantee the uniqueness of the QNE are dependent on the channel gains
between links. The random nature of channel gains greatly reduces the possibility of having a unique
QNE, which further limits the effectiveness of the proposed noncooperative game. More specifically,
the convergence to a QNE cannot be always achieved. This forces the links to terminate their iterative
optimizations at some point, resulting in a low secrecy sum-rate. To overcome this issue, we introduce
several modifications to the proposed game. Every modification appears as the addition of a term in the
utility function of each player. These modifications allow us to not only guarantee the convergence of the
game, but also give links the ability to selectively converge to a specific QNE among multiple QNEs.
Selecting a particular QNE is done based on how much it satisfies a particular design criterion. We propose
three possibilities for QNE selection, each providing different benefits and requiring a different amounts
of communication overhead. The proposed QNE selection algorithm can improve the performance of the
formerly proposed noncooperative game while keeping the communication overhead reasonably low.
The concept of QNE has been recently used in [12] in sum-rate maximization in cognitive radio users.
However, no effort has been made to improve the performance of achieved QNEs. The work in [13] also
considers the use of QNEs to jointly optimize the sensing and power allocation of cognitive radio users
in the presence of primary users. Although in this work some improvements have been made on the
performance of the resulting QNEs, they are specific to cognitive radios and thus not extendable to other
networks. The framework we propose can be generalized to any similarly structured game. Overall, the
contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose a noncooperative game to model PHY-layer secrecy optimization in a multi-link MIMO
wiretap interference network. Due to the nonconvexity of each player’s optimization problem, the
analysis of equilibria is done through the concept of QNE. We show that the set of QNEs includes
NE as well.
• Because many network scenarios may involve multiple QNEs, the purely noncooperative games do
not always guarantee the convergence to a unique QNE. Hence, we introduce several modifications to
the proposed game to guarantee the convergence to a QNE. The modifications appear as the additional
terms in the utility function of the players and keep the distributed nature of the noncooperative game.
• We show that the modified game allows users to select a QNE among multiple QNEs according to
a design criterion. QNE selection makes it possible to improve the resulting secrecy sum-rate of the
modified game compared to a purely noncooperative game.
• We show that the freedom in choosing the design criterion gives a degree of flexibility to the modified
game. We propose three different choices for the design criterion, each of which requiring a different
level of coordination between links and offering a different amount secrecy sum-rate improvement.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the system model. In Section
III, we formulate the optimization of information signal and AN as a noncooperative game. The conditions
for the existence and uniqueness of the QNE are established in Section IV. In Section V, we modify the
proposed noncooperative game, and introduce the theoretical aspects of our QNE selection method. In
Section VI an algorithm that implements the QNE selection is given and practical considerations are
discussed. We present a centralized algorithm as a measure of efficiency of our proposed game in Section
VII. In Section VIII simulation results assess the performance of our algorithms. Finally, Section IX
concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the network shown in Fig. 1, where Q transmitters, Q > 1, communicate with Q correspond-
ing receivers. The qth transmitter is equipped with NTq antennas, q = 1, . . . , Q. The qth receiver has
NRq antennas, q = 1, . . . , Q. The link between each transmit-receive (Alice-Bob) pair may experience
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Fig. 1: System Model
interference from the other Q− 1 links. There are K noncolluding Eves overhearing the communications.
The kth Eve, k = 1, . . . , K, has Ne,k receive antennas1. The received signal at the qth receiver, yq, is
yq = H˜qquq +
Q∑
r=1
r 6=q
H˜rqur + nq, q ∈ Q (1)
where H˜rq (H˜qq) denotes the NRq×NTr (NRq×NTq ) channel matrix between the rth (qth) transmitter and
qth receiver, uq is the NTq×1 vector of transmitted signal from the qth transmitter, nq is the NRq×1 vector
of additive noise whose elements are i.i.d zero-mean circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distributed
with unit variance, and Q , {1, . . . , Q}. The term ∑Qr=1
r 6=q
H˜rqur is the multi-user interference (MUI). The
received signal at the kth eavesdropper, zk, is expressed as
zk =
Q∑
q=1
Gqkuq + ne,k, k ∈ K (2)
where Gqk is the Ne,k ×NTq channel matrix between the qth transmitter and the kth eavesdropper, ne,k is
the Ne,k×1 vector of additive noise at the kth eavesdropper, and K , {1, . . . , K}. The transmitted signal
uq has the following form:
uq , sq + wq (3)
where sq is the information signal and wq is the AN. We use the Gaussian codebook for the information
signal and the Gaussian noise for the AN2. The matrices Σq and Wq indicate the covariance matrices of
sq and wq, respectively.
The qth link, q ∈ Q, together with K eavesdroppers form a compound wiretap channel for which the
achievable secrecy rate of the qth link is written as [15]:
Rsecq (Σq,Wq) , Cq(Σq,Wq)−max
k∈K
Ce,q,k(Σq,Wq), q ∈ Q (4)
where Cq(Σq,Wq) is the information rate and Ce,q,k(Σq,Wq) is the received rate at the kth eavesdropper,
1The treatment can be easily extended to colluding eavesdroppers by combining the K Eves into one with
∑K
k=1Ne,k antennas.
2Other practical codebooks for the information signal (e.g., QAM) can be approximated to a Gaussian codebook with a capacity gap (see
[14]).
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k ∈ K, while eavesdropping on the qth link, q ∈ Q. Specifically,
Cq(Σq,Wq) , ln
∣∣I + M−1q HqqΣqHHqq∣∣ =
ln
∣∣Mq + HqqΣqHHqq∣∣+ ln ∣∣M−1q ∣∣ (5)
where Mq , I + HqqWqHHqq +
∑Q
r=1
r 6=q
Hrq (Σr + Wr)HHrq and
Ce,q,k(Σq,Wq) , ln
∣∣I + M−1e,q,kGqkΣqGHqk∣∣ =
ln
∣∣Me,q,k + GqkΣqGHqk∣∣+ ln ∣∣M−1e,q,k∣∣ (6)
where Me,q,k , I + GqkWqGHqk +
∑Q
r=1
r 6=q
Grk (Σr + Wr)GHrk. The term Mq is the covariance matrix of
received interference at the qth receiver and Me,q,k is the covariance matrix of interference received at
the kth eavesdropper while eavesdropping on the qth link3. Notice that both Mq and Me,q,k include the
information signal and AN of other Q−1 links. Furthermore, we require tr(Σq +Wq) ≤ Pq for all q ∈ Q,
where tr(.) is the trace operator and Pq is a positive value that represents the amount of power available
(for both information and AN signals) at the qth transmitter.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We assume that the qth link, q ∈ Q, optimizes its information and AN signals (through their covariance
matrices Σq and Wq) to maximize its own secrecy rate. The dynamics of such interaction between Q
links can be modeled as a noncooperative game where each player (i.e., link) uses his best strategy to
maximize his own utility (i.e., secrecy rate) given the strategies of other players. The best response of
each player can be found by solving the following optimization problem
maximize
Σq ,Wq
Rsecq (Σq,Wq)
s.t. (Σq,Wq) ∈ Fq, q ∈ Q (7)
where Fq , {(Σq,Wq)|tr(Σq + Wq) ≤ Pq, Σq  0, Wq  0} is the set of all Hermitian matrices (Σq,Wq)
that are positive semi-definite (i.e., Σq  0, Wq  0) and meet the link’s power constraint.
Unfortunately, problem (7) is a nonconvex optimization problem. In the remainder of this section, we
aim to find a tractable solution for this problem. To that end, we first mention the following identity for
a positive definite matrix Mq of size NRq [16, Example 3.23]:
ln |M−1q | = f(S∗) = max
S∈CNRq×NRq ,S0
f(S) (8)
where f(S) , −tr(SMq) + ln |S|+NRq and S∗ ,M−1q is the solution to the most RHS of (8). Applying
the reformulation in (8) to the term ln |M−1q | in (5) and ln
∣∣Me,q,k + GqkΣqGHqk∣∣ in (6), (7) can be rewritten
as
maximize
Σq ,Wq ,Sq
fq(Σq,Wq, {Sq,k}Kk=0),
s.t. (Σq,Wq) ∈ Fq, Sq,k  0, q ∈ Q, k ∈ {0} ∪K (9)
3Specifically, while eavesdropping on a user, an eavesdropper is treating interference as additive (colored) noise.
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where {Sq,k}Kk=0 = [STq,0, . . . ,STq,K ]T , and
fq(Σq,Wq, {Sq,k}Kk=0) , ϕq(Σq,Wq,Sq,0)
−max
k∈K
ϕe,q,k(Σq,Wq,Sq,k) (10a)
ϕq(Σq,Wq,Sq,0) , −tr(Sq,0Mq) + ln |Sq,0|+NRq
+ ln
∣∣Mq + HqqΣqHHqq∣∣ (10b)
ϕe,q,k(Σq,Wq,Sq,k) , tr(Sq,k(Me,q,k + GqkΣqGHqk))
− ln |Sq,k| −Ne,k − ln |Me,q,k| . (10c)
Problem (9) is nonconvex with respect to (w.r.t) (Σq,Wq, {Sq,k}Kk=0). However, it is easy to verify that
problem (9) is convex w.r.t either (Σq,Wq) or {Sq,k}Kk=0 (by checking its Hessian). A stationary point to
problem (7) that satisfies its K.K.T optimality conditions then can be found by solving (9) sequentially
w.r.t (Σq,Wq) and {Sq,k}Kk=0 [5, Section IV-B]. Specifically, in one iteration, problem (9) is solved w.r.t
only {Sq,k}Kk=0 to find an optimal solution {S∗q,k}Kk=0. Next, with {S∗q,k}Kk=0 plugged in (10a), the problem in
(9) is optimized w.r.t (Σq,Wq) to find an optimal solution (Σ∗q,W
∗
q). This Alternating Optimization (AO)
cycle continues until reaching a convergence point. The nth iteration of AO, i.e., (Σnq ,W
n
q ,
{
Snq,k
}K
k=0
), is
as follows:
(Σnq,W
n
q) = arg max
(Σq ,Wq)∈Fq
fq(Σq,Wq,
{
Sn−1q,k
}K
k=0
) (11a)
Snq,0 , arg maxSq,00ϕq(Σ
n
q ,W
n
q ,Sq,0) = (M
n
q )
−1 =
(
I + HqqWnqH
H
qq +
Q∑
r=1
r 6=q
Hrq
(
Σ0r + W
0
r
)
HHrq
)−1
(11b)
Snq,k , arg maxSq,k0
ϕe,q,k(Σ
n
q ,W
n
q ,Sq,k) =
(
Mne,q,k + GqkΣq
nGHqk
)−1
=
(
I + Gqk(Σnq +W
n
q )G
H
qk +
Q∑
r=1
r 6=q
Grk
(
Σ0r + W
0
r
)
GHrk
)−1
, k 6= 0 (11c)
where Σ0r and W
0
r (for r 6= q) denote the received interference components at the qth receiver prior to
solving (9). Incorporating (11b) and (11c) in (11a), the solution to the convex problem (11a) can be found
using a convex optimization solver. Notice that in (11b) and (11c), the users do not coordinate with each
other in the middle of finding a stationary point for (9), for all q ∈ Q. Hence, the terms Σ0r and W0r ,
r 6= q remain constant during the AO iterations. To solve problem (9) faster, the authors in [5] solved the
smooth approximation of (7) based on the log-sum-exp inequality [16, chapter 3.1.5], which states that
max{a1, . . . , aK} ≤ 1
β
ln(
K∑
k=1
eβak) ≤ max{a1, . . . , aK}+ 1
β
lnK. (12)
where ak ∈ R and β > 0. Applying (12) to (4), we can write problem (7) as
maximize
Σq ,Wq
R¯s,q(Σq,Wq)
s.t. (Σq,Wq) ∈ Fq, q ∈ Q (13)
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where
R¯s,q(Σq,Wq) ,Cq(Σq,Wq)
− 1
β
ln(
K∑
k=1
exp {βCe,q,k(Σq,Wq)}), q ∈ Q. (14)
Hence, we can do the same reformulation procedure taken in (9) to end up with the following smooth
reformulation [5]:
maximize
Σq ,Wq ,Sq
f¯q(Σq,Wq, {Sq,k}Kk=0),
s.t. (Σq,Wq) ∈ Fq, Sk  0, q ∈ Q, k ∈ K (15)
where
f¯q(Σq,Wq, {Sq,k}Kk=0) ,ϕq(Σq,Wq,Sq,0)
− 1
β
ln
( K∑
k=1
eβϕe,q,k(Σq ,Wq ,Sq,k)
)
. (16)
with ϕq and ϕe,q,k defined in (10b) and (10c), respectively. Hence, the AO iteration in (11a) changes to
(Σnq,W
n
q) = arg max
(Σq ,Wq)∈Fq
f¯q(Σq,Wq,
{
Sn−1q,k
}K
k=0
), (17)
while
{
Sn−1q,k
}K
k=0
remain the same as (11b) and (11c)4. After plugging (11b) and (11c) into (17), the
solution to (17) at the nth iteration is computed using the Projected Gradient (PG) algorithm. The lth
iteration of PG algorithm while solving (17) is as follows.(
Σˆn,l+1q
Wˆ
n,l+1
q
)
= ProjFq
(
Σn,lq + αl∇Σq f¯n,lq
Wn,lq + αl∇Wq f¯n,lq
)
, (18)
(
Σn,l+1q
Wn,l+1q
)
=
(
Σn,lq
Wn,lq
)
+ εl
(
Σˆn,l+1q −Σn,lq
Wˆ
n,l+1
q −Wn,lq
)
, (19)
where αl and εl are step sizes that can be determined using Wolfe conditions for PG method [17]; ProjFq
is the projection operator to the set Fq, which can be written as
ProjFq
(
Σ˜
W˜
)
= min
W,Σ∈Fq
||W− W˜||2F + ||Σ− Σ˜||2F ; (20)
and (∇Σq f¯n,lq ,∇Wq f¯n,lq ) =
(
∇Σq f¯q(Σn,lq ,Wn,lq ,
{
Sn−1q,k
}K
k=0
),
4As far as optimality is concerned, it is shown in [5] that in the single-user scenario, the limit point of AO iterations done using (17),
(11b), and (11c) are very close to the solutions found from AO iterations done using (11a), (11b), and (11c).
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∇Wq f¯q(Σn,lq ,Wn,lq ,
{
Sn−1q,k
}K
k=0
)
)
where
∇Σq f¯q(Σn,lq ,Wn,lq ,
{
Sn−1q,k
}K
k=0
) =
HHqq(M
n,l
q + HqqΣ
n,l
q H
H
qq)
−1Hqq −
K∑
k=1
ρn,lq,kG
H
q,kS
n−1
q,k Gq,k, (21a)
Mn,lq = I + HqqW
n,l
q H
H
qq +
Q∑
r=1
r 6=q
Hrq
(
Σ0r + W
0
r
)
HHrq, (21b)
ρn,lq,k =
eβϕe,q,k(Σ
n,l
q ,Wn,lq ,Sn−1q,k )∑K
j=1 e
βϕe,q,j(Σ
n,l
q ,Wn,lq ,Sn−1q,j )
, (21c)
∇Wq f¯q(Σn,lq ,Wn,lq ,
{
Sn−1q,k
}K
k=0
) =
HHqq
(
(Mn,lq + HqqΣ
n,l
q Hqq)
−1−Sn−1q,0
)
Hqq+
K∑
k=1
ρn,lq,kG
H
qk
(
(Mn,le,q,k)
−1 −Sn−1q,k
)
Gqk, (21d)
Mn,le,q,k = I + GqkW
n,l
q G
H
qk +
Q∑
r=1
r 6=q
Grk
(
Σ0r + W
0
r
)
GHrk. (21e)
The projection in (20) can be efficiently computed according to [5, Fact 1]. We refer to the game where
the actions of the players are defined by (51) as the proposed smooth game. Now that we have the response
of each user, we can analyze the dynamics of the proposed smooth game.
A pseudo-code of the proposed smooth game mentioned so far is shown in Algorithm 1. As mentioned
earlier, finding a stationary point for (51) for each user consists of two nested loops. The inner loop
involves the gradient projection which is shown in (18) and (19) (i.e., the loop in Line 6 of Algorithm
1). Once the optimal solution to inner loop is found, one AO iteration is done by recalculating {Sq,k}Kk=0
according to (11b) and (11c) in the outer loop (i.e., Line 4). After the AO iterations converge to a stationary
point, the users begin their transmissions using the computed precoders of information signal and AN5.
Therefore, one round of this competitive secrecy rate maximization is done. Notice that according to Line
2, the players will be notified of actions of each other (i.e., recalculate the received interference) only
after the AO iterations has converged6. The last round of the game will be the one where the convergence
is reached.
5Although the optimization of covariance matrices of information signal and AN has been taken into account so far, the precoders can be
found using eigenvalue decomposition.
6Such procedure in Line 2 of Algorithm 1 also explains the reason why W0r and Σ0r in (11) and (21) remain constant during AO iterations.
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Algorithm 1 Proposed Smooth Game
Initialize: Σ1,1q , W1,1q , tr(Σ1,1q + W1,1q ) < Pq , ∀q ∈ Q
1: repeat
2: Each link q computes Mq , Me,q,k, ∀k ∈ K locally
3: for q =1,. . . ,Q do
4: for n = 1,. . . do
5: Compute Sn−1q,k , k = 0, . . . ,K
6: for l = 1,. . . do
7: Compute ϕe,q,k(Σn,lq ,Wn,lq , Sn−1q,k ), M
n,l
q , Mn,le,q,k, ∀(q, k)
8: Compute (Σn,l+1q ,Wn,l+1q ) using (18)-(21) % Use Wolfe conditions
9: end for
10: end for
11: end for
12: until Convergence to QNE
IV. EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF THE QNE
Before we begin to analyze the existence and uniqueness of the QNE, we review fundamentals of
variational inequality theory as the basis of our analyses.
Variational Inequality Theory: Let F : Q → RN be a vector-valued continuous real function, where
N > 1 and Q ⊆ RN is a nonempty, closed, and convex set. The variational inequality VI(F,Q) is the
problem of finding a vector x∗ such that
(x− x∗)TF (x∗) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Q. (22)
The relation between variational inequality and game theory is summarized in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. [11, Chapter 2] Consider Q players in a noncooperative game with utility function fq(x)
for the qth player (not to be confused with the fq defined in (9)), where x ∈ Q and x = [x1, x2, ..., xQ]T ,
xq is the qth player’s strategy, and fq(x) is concave w.r.t xq for all q. The set Q is comprised of all
strategy sets (i.e., Q = ∏Qq=1Qq, where Qq is the qth player’s strategy set). Assuming the differentiability
of fq(x) w.r.t xq and that Qq is a closed and convex set for all q, the vector x∗ is the NE of the game if
for F (x) = [−∇x1f1(x),−∇x2f2(x), ...,−∇xQfQ(x)]T we have:
(x− x∗)TF (x∗) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Q.
A. Variational Inequality in Complex Domain
The theory of VI mentioned in (22) assumes that Q ⊆ Rn. However, this assumption might not be of
our interest because the strategies of the players in our proposed game are two complex matrices (i.e., Σq
and Wq). Therefore, an alternative definition for VI in complex domain is needed. We use the definitions
derived by the authors in [18] to define VI in complex domain.
Minimum Principle in Complex Domain: Consider the following optimization
minimize
Z
f(Z)
s.t. Z ∈ K (23)
where f : K → R is convex and continuously differentiable on K where K ⊆ CN ′×N , N ′ > 1, and N > 1.
X ∈ K is an optimal solution to (23) if and only if we have [18, lemma23]
〈Z− X,∇Zf(X)〉 ≥ 0, ∀Z ∈ K. (24)
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where 〈A,B〉 = Re (Tr (AHB)).
1) VI in Complex Domain: Using the definition of minimum principle in complex domain, we can
now define the VI problem in the domain of complex matrices. For a complex-valued matrix FC(Z) :
K → CN ′×N where K ⊆ CN ′×N , the VI in the complex domain is the problem of finding a complex
matrix Y such that the following is satisfied [18, Definition 25]〈
Z− Y, FC(Y)〉 ≥ 0, ∀Z ∈ K. (25)
B. Quasi-Nash Equilibrium
It should be emphasized that the optimization problem of each player mentioned in (13) is nonconvex.
Hence, the solution found for each link by solving (51) at Line 10 of Algorithm 1 is only a stationary
point of problem (13). As a consequence, the traditional concepts of concave games used in proving
the existence of a NE are not applicable here. Specifically, according to [9], the quasi-concavity of each
player’s utility w.r.t his strategy is required in proving the existence of a NE; an assumption that is not true
in our game. Instead, we analyze the proposed (nonconvex) smooth game based on the relaxed equilibrium
concept of QNE [10]. In the following, a formal definition of QNE is given [10].
Consider a noncooperative game with Q player each of whose strategies are restricted by some private
constraints denoted as
Xq = {xq ∈ Xq|hq(xq) ≤ 0}. (26)
The set Xq is a convex set, and hq : ξq → Rlq is a continuously differentiable mapping on the open
convex set ξq containing Xq. No convexity assumption is made on hq. Hence, although Xq is a convex
set, Xq is not necessarily so. Player q has an objective function gq : ξ → R, assumed to be continuously
differentiable where ξ =
∏Q
q=1 ξq. The action of each player is formulated as follows:
minimize
xq∈Xq
gq(xq, x−q)
s.t. xq ∈ Xq. (27)
Obviously, the equivalent formulation can be written for when the action of each player is maximizing
an objective (e.g., utility). Given the actions of other players, i.e., x∗−q, and provided that a constraint
qualification (CQ) condition holds at a point x∗q , a necessary condition for x
∗
q to be an optimal point of
player q’s optimization problem (i.e., action) is the existence of a nonnegative constant vector µ∗q ∈ Rlq+
such that
∇xqLq(x∗q, x∗−q, µ∗q) = ∇xqgq(x∗q, x∗−q) + µ∗qT∇xqhq(x∗q) = 0, (28a)
µ∗q
Thq(x
∗
q) = 0, (28b)
hq(x
∗
q) ≤ 0, xq ∈ Xq. (28c)
If any CQ is satisfied at x∗q , the optimality conditions in (28) can be written as a VI over the set Xq;
that is, the necessary condition for x∗q to be an optimal solution to player q’s optimization problem is if
x∗q solves VI(∇xqLq(•, x∗−q, µ∗q), Xq) [11, Proposition 1.3.4]. Furthermore, the existence of a nonnegative
vector µ∗q together with the complementarity of µ
∗
q and hq(x
∗
q) can be interpreted as µ
∗
q being such that
− (µq − µ∗q)Thq(x∗q) ≥ 0, ∀µq ∈ Rlq+. (29)
Clearly, if hq(x∗q) is not binding, i.e., hq(x
∗
q) < 0, then µ
∗
q = 0 satisfies (29). Furthermore, when hq(x
∗
q)
is binding, i.e., hq(x∗q) = 0, inequality (29) is trivially satisfied for all µq ∈ Rlq+. Hence, using (29) and
the fact that x∗q solves VI(∇xqLq(•, x∗−q, µ∗q), Xq), the pair (x∗q, µ∗q) solves the following VI:(
xq − x∗q
µq − µ∗q
)T
Γq(x, µq) ≥ 0, ∀(xq, µq) ∈ Rq = Xq × Rlq+ (30)
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where
Γq(x, µq) =
( ∇xqLq(•, x∗−q, µ∗q)
−hq(x∗q)
)
. (31)
Notice that although it might seem that VI(∇xqLq(•, x∗−q, µ∗q), Xq) and (29) cannot be combined to build
(30), using the fact that VI is a generalized definition of a set-valued mapping7, we are able to justify
(30). it can be proved that for the set-valued mappings NXq(xq) and NRlq+
(µq), we have NXq×Rlq+
(xq, µq) =
NXq(xq) × NRlq+ (µq) [19]. The same conclusion holds for VI problems. Hence, inequality (30) can be
deduced.
Concatenating the inequality in (30) over the set of players, the QNE can be defined as follows:
Definition 1. The QNE is the pair
(
x∗q, µ
∗
q
)
, q = 1 . . . , Q, that satisfies the following inequality:((
xq − x∗q
µq − µ∗q
)Q
q=1
)T
(Γq(x, µq))
Q
q=1 ≥ 0,
∀(xq, µq)Qq=1 ∈
Q∏
q=1
Rq =
Q∏
q=1
(Xq × Rlq+) (32)
where (•)Qq=1 denotes a column vector.
Notice that the set
∏Q
q=1Rq is a convex set, and if the actions of each player is a convex program,
the QNE reduces to NE. In our scenario, since the private constraints for each player is a convex set, we
embedded the private constraints into the set Rq defined in (32). We need to emphasize the fact that the
constant vectors µ∗q for all q can only be defined if the optimization problem of each player satisfies some
CQ conditions. For players with convex problems, these constant vectors are trivially satisfied since the
K.K.T conditions are necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality in convex programs.
One intuition that can be given on the concept of QNE is as follows. QNE is point where no player has
an incentive to unilaterally change his strategy because any change makes a player not satisfy the K.K.T
conditions of his problem. This is in contrast with the definition of NE in which the lack of incentives at
NE is because of losing optimality. Again, optimality and satisfying the K.K.T conditions are equivalent
when players solve convex programs.
C. Analysis of QNE
According to the aforementioned definition, the QNEs are tuples that satisfy the K.K.T conditions of
all players’ optimization problems. Under a constraint qualification, stationary points of each player’s
optimization problem satisfy its K.K.T conditions. To begin the analysis of the QNE, we first show that
the stationary point found using AO mentioned previously (i.e., Line 4-10 of Algorithm 1) satisfies the
K.K.T conditions of (13).
Proposition 1. For the qth link, q ∈ Q, the stationary point found using AO (i.e., Line 4-10 of Algorithm
1) satisfies the K.K.T conditions of (13).
Proof: See Appendix A.
Now that the K.K.T optimality of the stationary point found by AO iterations is proved, we rewrite
the K.K.T conditions of all players to a proper VI problem [10]. The solution(s) to the obtained VI is
the QNE(s) of the proposed smooth game. For the proposed smooth game defined using (51), we can
7A point-to-set map, also called a multifunction or a set-valued map, is a map N from Rn into the power set of Rn, i.e., for every
x ∈ Rn, NRn(x) is a (possibly empty) subset of Rn [11, Chapter 2.1.3]. To avoid confusion, note that the definition of a set-valued map is
fundamentally different from that of a vector function such as hq(xq) defined in (26).
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establish the following VI to characterize the QNE points. Let the QNE point be as follows
Y = {Yq}Qq=1 , [ΣT ,WT ]T = {[ΣTq ,WTq ]T}Qq=1 (33)
where {[ΣTq ,WTq ]T}Qq=1 = [ΣT1 ,WT1 ,ΣT2 ,WT2 , . . . ,ΣTQ,WTQ, ]T . The function FC(Z) is written as
FC = FC(Σ,W,S) =
{
FCq (Σq,Wq, {Sq,k}Kk=0)
}Q
q=1
,{[−(∇Σq f¯q)T ,−(∇Wq f¯q)T ]T}Q
q=1
(34)
where the terms ∇Σq f¯q and ∇Wq f¯q are given in (21). Therefore, the system of inequalities indicated as
V I(FC,K) can be established according to (25), where K = ∏Qq=1Fq. Furthermore, for a given response
Σq and Wq, the solutions of {Sq,k}Kk=0 are uniquely determined by (11b) and (11c) for all q. Hence, from
now on, we assume that the values of {Sq,k}Kk=0 are already plugged into FCq
(
Σq,Wq, {Sq,k}Kk=0
)
, so we
drop the term {Sq,k}Kk=0 in the subsequent equations for notational convenience.
In order to show that the K.K.T conditions are valid necessary conditions for a stationary solution of
(13), an appropriate CQ must hold [20]. In this paper, we use the Slater’s constraint qualification [20] as
the strategy set of each player is a convex set. Moreover, at NE (if it exists) all of the players use their
best responses, i.e., each player has found the optimal solution to his optimization problem and will not
deviate from that. Since the optimal solution for each player also satisfies the K.K.T conditions, then NE
must be a QNE [10]. In fact, the set of QNEs includes the NE.
D. Existence and Uniqueness of the QNE
To begin our analysis in this part, we consider the VI described by (25), (33), and (34) again. In
the case of the domain of Z being square complex matrices, the definition of VI in complex domain
can be further simplified to achieve the same form of VI in the real case (i.e., (22)). More specifically,
let FC be a 2N × N matrix and let vec(FC) , [(F1)T , . . . , (FN)T ]T denote a 2N2 × 1 vector where
Fi , [FC(Z)]:,i, i = 1, . . . , N , denotes the vector corresponding to the ith column of FC(Z). Furthermore,
let vec(Z) = [[Z]T:,1, . . . , [Z]T:,N ]T be the vector version of the complex matrix Z. Hence, the vector version
of the VI in complex domain can be expressed as
(vec(Z)− vec(Y))H vec(FC(Y)) ≥ 0, ∀Z ∈ K. (35)
In order to further simplify the VI in complex domain to be completely identical to the real case, we define
FR , [Re
{
vec(FC)
}T
, Im
{
vec(FC)
}T
]T and ZR , [Re {vec(Z)}T , Im {vec(Z)}T ]T where Re{...} and
I{...} are the real and imaginary parts, respectively. Therefore, the real-vectorized representation of (25)
can be written as (
ZR − YR)T (FR(YR)) ≥ 0, ∀ZR ∈ KR, where KR ⊆ R2N2 . (36)
The vector form of (33) and (34) are as follows:
vec(Z) = [vec(Σ¯)T , vec(W¯)T ]T =
{
[vec(Σ¯q)T , vec(W¯q)T ]T
}Q
q=1
(37)
vec(FC(Z))=
{[
vec(−∇Σq f¯q)T , vec(−∇Wq f¯q)T
]T}Q
q=1
. (38)
Hence, the vector form of the complex VI problem V I(FC,K) can be written as(
[vec(Σ)T , vec(W)T ]T − [vec(Σ¯)T , vec(W¯)T ]T )H vec(FC(Σ¯, W¯)) ≥ 0. (39)([
ΣR
T
,WRT
]
−
[
Σ¯R
T
, W¯R
T
])
FR ≥ 0, ∀(ΣR,WR) ∈ KR, KR ⊆ Rm. (40)
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Hence, the equivalent real-vectorized representation of the VI in (25) that complies with the definition in
(22) can be determined as (40) wherem ,
∑Q
q=1 2N
2
Tq
. Note that the set of matrices (Σ1, . . . ,ΣQ,W1, . . . ,WQ)
that are in K = ∏Qq=1Fq are the ones whose real-vectorized versions will be inside KR. Now that the
proposed smooth game is modeled as a real-vectorized VI, we can use the following theorem to prove
the existence of the QNE.
Theorem 2. The proposed smooth game, where the actions of each player is given by (51) admits at least
one QNE.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The uniqueness of the QNE is discussed in the following theorem:
Theorem 3. The proposed smooth game characterized by (51) has a unique QNE if
λq,min >
Q∑
q=1
q 6=l
|||DZlFCq (Zq)|||2, q ∈ Q (41)
where λq,min is the smallest eigenvalue of DZqFCq (Zq), and DZlF
C
q (Zq) ,
∂ vec(FCq (Zq))
∂ vec(Zl)T
, for all q, l ∈ Q2,
is defined as
DZlF
C
q (Zq) ,
[
DΣl(−∇Σq f¯q) DWl(−∇Σq f¯q)
DΣl(−∇Wq f¯q) DWl(−∇Wq f¯q)
]
. (42)
Proof: See Appendix C.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED GAME IN THE PRESENCE OF MULTIPLE QNES
A. On the Convergence of Algorithm 1
The conditions for the uniqueness of the QNE do not guarantee the convergence of Algorithm 1 to
a (unique) QNE. Since the optimization of each player is nonconvex, only stationary points of play-
ers’ utilities could be achieved. Hence, solving each player’s optimization problem using AO does not
necessarily lead to the best response of each player. This hinders us from proving the convergence of
Algorithm 1. However, we verified the convergence via simulations. In this section, we present a slightly
modified algorithm, namely, the gradient-response algorithm with proof of convergence. Furthermore, the
gradient-response algorithm paves the way for further performance improvements introduced later in this
paper.
B. Gradient-Response Algorithm
A solution to the VI in (40) can be characterized by the following iteration [11, Chapter 12]:
x(i+1) = ΠKR
(
x(i) − γFR(x(i), {S(i)q,k}Kk=0)
)
(43)
where ΠKR is the projection to set KR, x =
[
ΣR
T
,WRT
]T
, the superscript (i) is the number of iterations,
and γ = diag([γ1, . . . , γm]T ) is a diagonal matrix which indicates the step size that each player takes in
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the improving direction of his utility function. The solutions to {S(i)q,k}Kk=0 are as follows:
S(i)q,0 , (M(i)q )−1 =(
I + HqqW(i)q H
H
qq +
Q∑
r=1
r 6=q
Hrq
(
Σ(i−1)r + W
(i−1)
r
)
HHrq
)−1
, (44a)
S(i)q,k 6=0,
(
M(i)e,q,k + GqkΣq
(i)GHqk
)−1
=(
I + Gqk(Σ(i)q +W
(i)
q )G
H
qk+
Q∑
r=1
r 6=q
Grk
(
Σ(i−1)r +W
(i−1)
r
)
GHrk
)−1
(44b)
where (44b) holds for k 6= 0. It is easy to confirm that the iteration in (43) is a simplified version of the
projection done by each user in (18) and (19). Notice that the only difference of the gradient-response
algorithm, characterized by iteration in (43), from Algorithm 1 is that at each round of the gradient-
response algorithm, a player only does one iteration of the PG method (i.e., (18)) and one iteration
according to (44). The real-vectorized version of the gradient-response algorithm is shown in (43). Since
the values of {S(i)q,k}Kk=0 are uniquely determined for a given x(i), we drop the term {S(i)q,k}Kk=0 from the
argument of FR for notational convenience.
Assuming that FR is strongly monotone (with modulus cs/2)8 and Lipschitz continuous (with constant
L)9 w.r.t (Σq,Wq), the convergence to a unique solution follows if γi′ = d < csL2 , ∀i′ = 1, . . . ,m, where
d is constant. Hence, the mapping x→ ΠKR
(
x− γFR(x)) becomes a contraction mapping and the fixed
points of this map are solutions of the VI in (40) [11, Chapter 12]. It turns out that sufficient conditions
for the strong monotonicity of V I(FR,KR) are in fact the same as the conditions derived in (41) for the
uniqueness of the QNE10. Therefore, based on (43), a pseudo-code of the gradient-response algorithm is
given in Algorithm 2. Note that the operation in Line 6 of Algorithm 2 is the same as the iteration in
(43). In fact, since the set KR is a Cartesian product of players’ strategies, the iteration in (43) can be
easily converted back to its matrix form to have the following iteration:(
Σ
(i+1)
q
W(i+1)q
)
= ProjFq
 Σ(i)q + γ′q∇Σq f¯q(Σ(i)q ,W(i)q ,
{
S(i)q,k
}K
k=0
)
W(i)q + γ′q∇Wq f¯q(Σ(i)q ,W(i)q ,
{
S(i)q,k
}K
k=0
)
 ,∀q ∈ Q. (45)
Notice that γ′q is a diagonal matrix that can obtained by dividing the matrix γ into Q block-diagonal
matrices. That is, with a slight abuse of notations, γ = diag([γ1, . . . , γm]T ) = γ′ = diag(γ′1, . . . , γ
′
Q),
Q < m. Therefore, the gradient response in (43) can be shown as an iteration that is done in each
link, independent of other links. This is essentially a distributed implementation. The gradient-response
algorithm is given in Algorithm 2.
8The notion of strong monotonicity is a basic definition in the topic of VI (see Appendix C).
9It can be seen from (18) and (19) that the power constraint of each user makes the variations of ∇Σq f¯q and ∇Wq f¯q bounded for all
q ∈ Q. Hence, FR is Lipschitz continuous on KR.
10More explanation can be found in Appendix C.
August 7, 2018 DRAFT
SIYARI et al.: SECURE TRANSMISSIONS USING ARTIFICIAL NOISE IN MIMO WIRETAP INTERFERENCE CHANNEL: A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH 15
Algorithm 2 Gradient-Response Algorithm
Initialize: Σ(1)q , W(1)q , tr(Σ(1)q + W(1)q ) < Pq , ∀q
1: repeat % superscript (i) indicates the iterations starting from here
2: Compute Mq , Me,q,k, ∀(q, k) ∈ Q×K
3: Compute S(i)q,k, ∀(q, k) ∈ Q×K
4: Compute ϕe,q,k(Σ
(i)
q ,W(i)q , S(i)q,k), ∀(q, k) ∈ Q×K
5: for q =1,. . . ,Q do
6: Compute (Σ(i+1)q ,W(i+1)q ) using (45)
7: end for
8: until Convergence to QNE
The convergence point of Algorithm 2 is a QNE of the game where players’ actions are defined by
(51). Specifically, assume that for i → ∞, the convergence point is denoted as (Σ¯, W¯). Hence, we have
for all q ∈ Q
S¯q,0 = arg max
Sq,00
ϕq(Σ¯q, W¯q,Sq,0) (46a)
S¯q,k = arg max
Sq,k0
ϕe,q,k(Σ¯q, W¯q,Sq,k), k 6= 0. (46b)
The solution of (46a) and (46b) is the same as (44a) and (44b) for i → ∞. By plugging the solutions
of (46a) and (46b) in ∇Σq f¯q(Σ¯q, W¯q, {Sq,k}Kk=0) and ∇Wq f¯q(Σ¯q, W¯q, {Sq,k}Kk=0), the convergence point
of Algorithm 2 is a QNE of the proposed game. Overall, by using the gradient-response algorithm, the
uniqueness of the QNE and γi′ = d < csL2 , ∀i′ = 1, . . . ,m directly suggest the convergence of the iteration
in (43). Hence, a separate proof for the convergence of Algorithm 2 is not needed.
The iteration proposed in (43) has two major issues. First, the Lipschitz constant of FR(x) has to be
known. Apart from being difficult to derive, the knowledge of Lipschitz constant requires a centralized
computation. Second, the strong monotonicity of FR cannot be always guaranteed. In fact, the conditions
derived in (41) are very dependent on the channel gains and network topology. Hence, in most typical
network scenarios, the inequality in (41) cannot be satisfied. This means that in some situations, the game
might have more than one QNE. Consequently, the convergence of Algorithm 2 is in jeopardy. However,
on the condition that FR is monotone11, which is a weaker condition than strong monotonicity, the ability
to choose between multiple QNEs is possible. This means that the users are able to select the QNE that
satisfies a certain design criterion, thus guaranteeing convergence in the case of multiple QNEs. Moreover,
depending on the design criterion, the performance of the resulting QNE in terms of the achieved secrecy
sum-rate can be improved. To do this, we first review the regularization methods proposed for VIs.
C. Tikhonov Regularization
The general idea of regularization techniques is to modify the players’ utility functions such that the
VI becomes strongly monotone (and hence easily solvable by using Algorithm 2), and the limit point of
a sequence of solutions for the modified VI converges to some solution of the original VI. In Tikhonov
regularization, the process of regularizing VI(FR,KR) involves solving a sequence of VIs, where the
following iteration is characterized for a given  [11, chapter 12]:
x(i+1) = ΠKR
(
x(i) − γT (FR(x(i)) + x(i))) . (47)
The solution to (47) when i→∞ is denoted as x(). Given that FR is monotone, solving a sequence of
(strongly monotone) VI(FR(x) + x,KR)’s while  → 0 has a limit point, (i.e., lim→0 x() exists) and
that limit point is equal to least-norm solution of the VI(FR,KR) [11, Theorem 12.2.3].
11See Appendix C to recall the difference between monotonicity and strong monotonicity.
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D. QNE Selection using Tikhonov Regularization
Generalizing the applicability of Tikhonov regularization, we are more interested in converging to the
QNE that is more beneficial to the users. In our approach to QNE selection, we define benefit as when
the selected QNE satisfies a particular design criterion. Let the set of solutions of VI(FR,KR) be denoted
as SOL(FR,KR). We want to select the NE that minimizes a strongly convex12 function Φ(x) : KR → R.
In fact, the QNE selection satisfies the following design criterion13
minimize Φ(x)
s.t. x ∈ SOL(FR,KR). (48)
The optimization in (48) is convex because the monotonicity of FR suggests that SOL(FR,KR) is a convex
set [11, Chapter 2]. The unique point that solves problem (48), is the solution to VI(∇Φ(x),SOL(FR,KR)).
However, as there is no prior knowledge on SOL(FR,KR) (i.e., QNEs are not known), this optimization
cannot be solved easily. To overcome this issue, we modify the function FR in VI(FR,KR) to
FR , FR + ∇Φ(x). (49)
As the function Φ(x) is a strongly convex function, its derivative w.r.t x is strongly monotone. Assuming
that FR is monotone, then the function FR is strongly monotone and the solution to VI(F
R
 ,KR), namely,
x(), is unique for all values of  > 0 (i.e., convergence to a QNE can be guaranteed). The iteration used
for QNE selection is written as
x(i+1) = ΠKR
(
x(i) − γ(i) (FR(x(i)) + (j)∇Φ(x) + θ(i)(x(i) − x(i−1))) . (50)
The iteration in (50) is the same as (47) with the difference that the multiplier of  in (47) is replaced by
∇Φ(x). The following theorem shows the potential of using (50) for QNE selection:
Theorem 4. [11, pp. 1128 and Theorem 12.2.5] Consider VI(FR ,KR) with x() as its solution. Assume
that KR is closed and convex, and SOL(FR,KR) is nonempty. The following claims hold:
• The assumption that KR is closed and convex together with the nonemptiness of SOL(FR,KR) (i.e.,
the existence of the QNE, proved in Theorem 2) are necessary and sufficient for x∞ = lim
→0
x() to
exist.
• Assuming that FR is monotone14, x∞ is the solution of VI(∇Φ(x), SOL(FR,KR)). This means that
a QNE among several QNEs can be selected15.
E. Guaranteeing Monotoncity of FR in Tikhonov Regularization
Theorem 4 requires FR to be monotone to be applicable. However, the monotonicity of FR, as
highlighted by Theorem 3, depends on many factors such as the channels between different nodes in
the network, meaning that it is not possible to always guarantee the monotonicity of FR. In order to
guarantee the monotonicity, we add a strongly concave term to the utility of each player. Let this term
be − τq
2
(||Σq − YΣq ||2F + ||Wq − YWq ||2F ) where ||.||F indicates the Frobenius norm. Hence, the utility of
each player defined in (51) will change to
maximize
Σq ,Wq ,Sq
f¯q(Σq,Wq, {Sq,k}Kk=0)−
τq
2
(||Σq − YΣq ||2F + ||Wq − YWq ||2F ) ,
s.t. (Σq,Wq) ∈ Fq, Sk  0, q ∈ Q, k ∈ K (51)
12A strongly convex function is a function whose derivative is strongly monotone. We use the definitions of [21] to distinguish between
different types of convexity.
13The discussion on how we determine the function Φ(x) will be tackled in Section VI-B.
14Later on, we elaborate on the monotonicity assumption for FR (cf. Section VIII-A).
15We emphasize that by QNE selection, the players are maximizing their (modified) utility functions. Hence, the noncooperative nature
of the game is preserved.
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where YΣq and YWq are complex constants which will be explained later. With this modification on the
utility of each player, a new VI problem, V I(FRτ ,KR) is established where:
FRτ (x) = F
R(x) + τ(x− y) (52)
where y is the vector that contains the vectorized versions of YΣq and YWq , and τ = diag(τ1, τ2, . . . , τm)
is an m×m diagonal matrix, and FR is not a function of y. This perturbation is also known as Proximal
Point regularization method [11, Chapter 12.3.2]. Recalling Definition 1, the augmented Jacobian matrix
of FRτ (x), namely as Jτ , is as follows
Jτ , J + τI (53)
where J is the augmented Jacobian matrix of FR and I is the identity matrix. Considering the matrix τ
as a free parameter, we can choose a suitable value for each diagonal element of τ , such that the matrix
Jτ becomes a diagonally dominant matrix. In the following we exploit the diagonal dominance of Jτ to
establish the monotonicity property of FRτ
16.
Let D(di, [Jτ ]ii), i = 1, . . . ,m be the closed disc centered at [Jτ ]ii with radius di =
∑
j 6=i |[Jτ ]ij|,
where [.]ii denotes the diagonal element and [Jτ ]ii = [J ]ii + τi. Using the Gerschgorin circle theorem
[22], for all i = 1, . . . ,m, every eigenvalue of Jτ is within at least one of the discs. We also know that
for the function FRτ , in order to be monotone, the matrix Jτ has to be APSD (cf. Appendix C). Hence,
provided that a suitable value for τi is chosen for all i = 1, . . . ,m, all the radii of the Gershgorin circles
must be less than their respective diagonal elements, ensuring that Jτ remains APSD. Using this fact, the
value for τi that guarantees Jτ to be APSD is
τi ≥ di − Jii, ∀i. (54)
Therefore, using the condition (54) with equality, the matrix Jτ becomes an APSD matrix, and conse-
quently, FRτ becomes monotone. Therefore, the Tikhonov regularization changes to solving the problem
V I(FRτ,,KR) where
FRτ, , FR(x) + τ(x− y) + (j)∇Φ(x) (55)
Building upon the perturbation in (52), we can now use FRτ instead of F
R in the original VI in (40)
which makes us able to use Tikhonov regularization and perform equilibrium selection. One might argue
that using FRτ instead of F
R is actually creating a new game with different solutions. In the following we
give a property that makes the use of FRτ reasonable. It can be easily seen that the perturbation F
R
τ does
not change the fact that the NE in V I(FRτ ,KR) still exists, i.e., the set SOL(FRτ ,KR) is nonempty (cf.
Theorem 5). Furthermore, the addition of a monotone term (i.e., τ(x− y) does not change the convexity
of utilities to their actions. We set the vector y to be y = x((j−1)), which means that while computing
the j-th member of solutions of V I(FRτ,,KR), namely as x((j)), the vector y is the same as the solution
found for V I(FRτ,,KR) when  = (j−1). Therefore, in the limit point where x∞ ∈ SOL(FRτ ,KR), we have
x∞ ∈ SOL(FRτ ,KR)⇒ (x− x∞)FRτ (x∞) > 0
⇒ (x− x∞)
(
FR(x∞) + τ(x∞ − x∞)
)
> 0
⇒ x∞ ∈ SOL(FR,KR). (56)
Hence, the term τ(x∞ − x∞) vanishes since the limit point is guaranteed to be reached.
F. Distributed Tikhonov Regularization
Tikhonov regularization (QNE selection) is done in two nested loops. In the inner loop, for a given (j),
the solution to VI(FR ,KR) will be found from the iteration in (47) (where the multiplier of  is replaced
16Later as we proceed, we present the equivalent regularization for the complex version of FR, i.e., FC as well.
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with ∇Φ(x)). In the outer loop, the next value of (j) will be chosen (according to a predefined sequence
such that limj→∞ (j) = 0) until the solution to VI(∇Φ(x),SOL(FR,KR)) is reached (cf. Theorem 4).
Despite having the ability to select a specific QNE among multiple QNEs, QNE selection requires
heavy signaling and centralized computation because still the Lipschitz Continuity constant L and strong
monotonicity modulus of FR (x) must be known (cf. Section V-B). In order to address these issues, we
introduce another regularization method, namely, proximal point regularization. In this regularization, a
term θ(i)(x(i)− x(i−1)) is added to the function FR (x) to build a function FRτ,,θ(x) , FRτ,(x) + θ(i)(x(i)−
x(i−1)) where θ(i) is a diagonal matrix. Considering this modification, the following property can be used:
Proposition 2. Let FRτ,(x) be a strictly monotone and Lipschitz continuous mapping17; maxz∈KR ||x|| ≤ C,
and maxz∈KR ||FRτ,|| ≤ B where C and B are positive constants. Furthermore, suppose that for a given
(j), the solution to VI(FRτ,,KR) is denoted as x((j)). Let x(i) denote the set of iterates defined by
x(i+1) = ΠKR
(
x(i) − γ(i) (FR(x(i)) + τ(x(i) − x((j−1))) + (j)∇Φ(x(i)) + θ(i)(x(i) − x(i−1))) (57)
where the step size matrix γ(i) is changing with the iterations. Lastly, set γ(i)θ(i) = c = diag([c1, . . . , cm])
where ci′ ∈ (0, 1),∀i′ = 1, . . . ,m is a constant, and let the following hold:∑
i=1
γ(i) =∞,
∞∑
i=1
(
γ(i)
)2
<∞, and
∞∑
i=1
(γ(i)max − γ(i)min) <∞. (58)
where γ(i)max and γ
(i)
min are respectively the maximum and minimum diagonal elements of the matrix γ
(i).
Therefore, we have limi→∞ x(i) = x((j)).
The proof of Proposition 2 can be found in [23, Proposition 3.4]. However, note that the assumption
of strict monotonicity of FRτ,(x) is immediately satisfied as F
R
τ,(x) is already strongly monotone (cf.
(49)). The conditions maxz∈KR ||x|| ≤ C and maxz∈KR ||FRτ,|| ≤ B can also be satisfied due to having
power constraints on each link. According to [23, Proposition 3.4], the step size γ(i) can be chosen as
γ
(i)
i′ = (i+ αi′)
−ω where αi′ is a positive integer for i′ = 1, . . . , N and 0 < ω < 1. Hence, we can write
γ(i)max = (i+ αmax)
−ω, γ(i)min = (i+ αmin)
−ω. (59)
Note that in Proposition 2, θ(i) is already set to θ(i) = c
γ(i)
. Using Proposition 2, we can design a distributed
transmit optimization algorithm without the knowledge of Lipschitz constant and strong monotonicity
modulus of FRτ,. The next section discusses the implementation of QNE selection using (57)
18.
VI. THE QNE SELECTION ALGORITHM: DESIGN AND DISCUSSION
In this section of the paper, we propose the QNE selection algorithm together with three possible
choices for the design criterion (i.e., Φ(x)). Each of these choices imposes a certain amount of signaling
overhead as well as a certain amount of improvement on the performance of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm
2.
A. QNE Selection Algorithm
The pseudo-code for the QNE selection algorithm is shown in Algorithm 3. As mentioned previously,
it can be seen in Algorithm 3 that the modified game (i.e., QNE selection algorithm) is comprised of
two nested loops: outer loop (i.e., line 1), and inner loop (i.e., line 3). In the outer loop the jth member
of (j)’s is selected. In the inner loop, the game s played among the players, and the players update their
17Note that Lipschitz continuity of FRτ,(x) requires both FR(x) and ∇Φ(x) to be Lipschitz continuous. Hence, the proposed choices for
Φ(x) in the next section are all Lipschitz continuous.
18Note that in all of the proposed algorithms throughout this paper, it was assumed that at each round of the game, all of the players are
maximizing the utilities. This update fashion is also known as Jacobi implementation. The feasibility of implementing the algorithms using
other update fashions (e.g., Gauss-Seidel or Asynchronous) can be a subject of future research.
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strategies according to (57). The sequence (j) must be a decreasing sequence such that limj→∞ (j) = 0.
The operation in line 10 of Algorithm 3 can be written as(
Σ
(i+1)
q
W(i+1)q
)
= ProjFq
 Σ(i)q + γ′q (∇Σq f¯q + τq (Σ(i)q −Σq((j−1)))+ (j)∇ΣqΦ(x(i))− θ(i)q (Σ(i)q −Σ(i−1)q ))
W(i)q + γ′q
(
∇Wq f¯q + τq
(
W(i)q −Wq((j−1))
)
+ (j)∇WqΦ(x(i))− θ(i)q (W(i)q −W(i−1)q )
)  .
(60)
Notice that θ(i)q is a diagonal matrix that can obtained via dividing the matrix θ(i) into Q block-diagonal
matrices. That is, (with a slight abuse of notations) θ(i) = diag(θ(i)1 , . . . , θ
(i)
Q ). In the next subsection, we
specifically explain the terms ∇ΣqΦ(x) and ∇WqΦ(x) in line 10, so that Algorithm 3 will be completely
defined. Lastly, notice that all of our analysis on VI problems were under the assumption that every player
is solving a minimization problem as his strategy. Hence, if maximization is the strategy of each player, the
proximal terms in (60) appear as a negative values. Furthermore, the addition of ∇ΣqΦ(x) and ∇WqΦ(x)
means that Φ(x) must be a strongly concave function of x.
Algorithm 3 QNE Selection Algorithm
Initialize: Σ(1)q , W(1)q , tr(Σ(1)q + W(1)q ) < Pq , ∀q, and j = 1
1: repeat % Outer loop: superscript (j) indicates the iterations starting from here
2: Choose the jth member of the sequence (j)
3: repeat % Inner loop: superscript (i) indicates the iterations starting from here
4: Compute Mq , Me,q,k, ∀(q, k) ∈ Q×K
5: Compute S(i)q,k, ∀(q, k) ∈ Q×K
6: Compute ϕe,q,k(Σ
(i)
q ,W(i)q , S(i)q,k), ∀(q, k) ∈ Q×K
7: for q = 1,. . . ,Q do
8: Update the values of τq for all q = 1, . . . , Q such that the inequality in (41) is satisfied
9: Replace ∇Σq f¯q with ∇Σq f¯q − τq
(
Σ
(i)
q −Σq((j−1))
)
+ (j)∇ΣqΦ(x(i))− θ(i)q
(
Σ
(i)
q −Σ(i−1)q
)
10: Replace ∇Wq f¯q with ∇Wq f¯q − τq
(
W(i)q −Wq((j−1))
)
+ (j)∇WqΦ(x(i))− θ(i)q
(
W(i)q −W(i−1)q
)
11: Compute (Σ(i+1)q ,W(i+1)q ) using (60)
12: end for
13: until Convergence to QNE % x(j) is found
14: j = j+1
15: until Convergence to limit point of x(j)’s
B. On the Choice of Design Criterion for QNE Selection
Assume that the derivatives of Φ(x) are described as:
∇Φ(x) , [∇RΣ1,W1Φ(x)T , . . . ,∇RΣQ,WQΦ(x)T ]T , (61a)
∇RΣq ,WqΦ(x) , [∇RΣqΦ(x)T ,∇RWqΦ(x)T ]T , q ∈ Q, (61b)
∇RΣqΦ(x) , [Re{vec(∇ΣqΦ(x))}T , Im{vec(∇ΣqΦ(x))}T ]T , (61c)
∇RWqΦ(x) , [Re{vec(∇WqΦ(x))}T , Im{vec(∇WqΦ(x))}T ]T . (61d)
We are now ready to present the possible choices of Φ(x):
1) Maximizing the sum of information rates: We aim to select the QNE that maximizes the sum-rate
of all links. Recalling the reformulated information rate (i.e., ϕq(Σq,Wq,Sq,k)) in (10b), Φ(x) can be
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described as (with q ∈ Q):
∇ΣqΦ(x) =
Q∑
r=1
r 6=q
HHqr
(
(Mr + HrrΣrHHrr)
−1 − Sr,0
)
Hqr, (62a)
∇WqΦ(x) =
Q∑
r=1
r 6=q
HHqr
(
(Mr + HrrΣrHHrr)
−1 − Sr,0
)
Hqr. (62b)
Notice that although we wrote Φ as a function of x, one can easily relate the vector x to the covariance
matrices {(Σq,Wq)}Qq=1 using (61) and (43). Hence, the derivatives of Φ(x) at the end of Algorithm 3
would be:
∇ΣqΦ(x) =
Q∑
r=1
r 6=q
HHqr
(
(M?r + HrrΣ
?
rHrr)
−1 − S?r,0
)
Hqr (63a)
∇WqΦ(x) =
Q∑
r=1
r 6=q
HHqr
(
(M?r + HrrΣ
?
rHrr)
−1 − S?r,0
)
Hqr (63b)
where M?r = I + Hrr(W
?
r)H
H
rr + Hqr(W
?
q + Σ
?
q)H
H
qr +
∑Q
l=1
l 6=q,r
Hlr (Σ?l + W
?
l )H
H
lr , with Σ
?
q and W
?
q being
the limit points of Σq and Wq. Integrating (63a) w.r.t. Σ?q and integrating (63b) w.r.t. W
?
q , we end up with
Φ(x) =
∑Q
q=1
∑Q
r=1
r 6=q
ϕr(Σr,Wr,Sr,0). Hence, at the end of Algorithm 3, the QNE that is a stationary point
of sum-rate of all links is selected, i.e., the point that is the unique solution of VI(∇Φ(x),SOL(FR,KR)).
2) Minimizing the received rates at Eves: We can describe Φ(x) by (with q ∈ Q)
∇ΣqΦ(x) =
Q∑
r=1
r 6=q
K∑
k=1
ρr,kGHrk
(
(Me,r,k−1 − Sr,k
)
Grk (64a)
∇WqΦ(x) =
Q∑
r=1
r 6=q
K∑
k=1
ρr,kGHrk
(
(Me,r,k−1 − Sr,k
)
Grk (64b)
Me,r,k , I + GrkWrGHrk + Gqk (Σq + Wq)GHqk+ (64c)
Q∑
l=1
l6=q,r
Glk (Σl + Wl)GHlk (64d)
where the term ρr,k is defined in (72). Following the same reasoning used in the previous QNE selection,
at the limit point of x((j)), we end up with Φ(x) =
∑Q
q=1
∑Q
r=1
r 6=q
− 1
β
ln(
∑K
k=1 exp{βϕe,r,k(Σr,Wr,Sr,k)}),
where ϕe,r,k(Σr,Wr,Sr,k) is defined in (10c). Hence, the selected QNE guides the game to the stationary
point of minimizing Eves’ received rates, i.e., the point that is the unique solution of VI(∇Φ(x),SOL(FR,KR)).
3) Maximizing the sum of secrecy rates: In this criterion, a simple addition of previous design criteria
gives us another QNE selection method, in which the QNE that is a stationary point of secrecy sum-rate
is selected.
VII. CENTRALIZED ALGORITHM
An appropriate measure of efficiency (i.e., social welfare) in our game would be the sum of utilities
of all players or the secrecy sum-rate. The price of anarchy (PoA) can be defined as the ratio between
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the performance of the optimal centralized solution for the secrecy sum-rate maximization problem and
the worst NE. However, such definition of PoA requires us to solve the secrecy sum-rate maximization
problem, which is a nonconvex problem. Moreover, all of the proposed algorithms converge to the QNEs
of the proposed game, which are not necessarily NEs. Hence, direct PoA analysis is not feasible. Instead,
to measure the efficacy of QNEs, we design a centralized algorithm that provides locally optimal solutions
for the (network-wide) secrecy sum-rate maximization problem. We refer to this algorithm as Centralized
Secrecy Sum-rate Maximization method (CSSM). The objective value of solving (66) via the CSSM is
considered as the social welfare in our game.
In CSSM, the objective is to find a stationary solution for the following optimization problem:
maximize
(Σq ,Wq)∈Fq , ∀q
Q∑
q=1
R¯s,q(Σq,Wq). (65)
Using the reformulation techniques given in Section III, the problem in (65) can be rewritten as
maximize
(Σq ,Wq ,Sq,k)
∀q,k
Q∑
q=1
f¯q(Σq,Wq, {Sq,k}Kk=0)
s.t. (Σq,Wq) ∈ Fq,∀q ∈ Q,
Sq,k  0, ∀(q, k) ∈ Q× {0} ∪K. (66)
Problem (66) can be shown to be convex w.r.t either [Σ,W] = {Σq,Wq}Qq=1 =
[
[Σ1,W1]T , . . . , [ΣQ,WQ]T
]
or S = {Sq,k}∀q,k = [S1,0, . . . ,S1,K ,S2,0, . . . ,S2,K , . . . ,SQ,K ]T . Hence, a stationary point of (65) can be
found by solving (66) sequentially w.r.t. [Σ,W] and S until reaching a convergence point. That is, in one it-
eration, problem (66) is solved w.r.t. S to find an optimal solution S∗. Next, with S∗ plugged in the objective
of (66), problem (66) can be optimized w.r.t. [Σ,W] to find an optimal solution [Σ∗,W∗] = {Σ∗q,W∗q}Qq=1.
Problem (66) is separable w.r.t. every element of S. Hence,
S∗q,0 , arg maxSq,00
Q∑
q=1
f¯q(Σq,Wq,Sq,k) = (Mq)−1
S∗q,k,arg maxSq,k0
Q∑
q=1
f¯q(Σq,Wq,Sq,k)=(
Me,q,k+GqkΣqnGHqk
)−1
=
Now, we can solve (66) w.r.t [Σ,W]. We use the augmented Lagrangian multiplier method [24] to derive
a centralized solution for [Σ∗,W∗]. Let cq = tr(Σq + Wq)− Pq < 0. The augmented Lagrangian of (66)
is [24]19
L(Σ,W, a,p,S∗) = −
Q∑
q=1
f¯q(Σq,Wq, {S∗q,k}Kk=0)+
1
2p
Q∑
q=1
{
(max{aq + pcq, 0})2 + a2q
}
(68)
where p is a positive penalty (to prevent constraint violations) and aq, q = 1, . . . , Q, are the nonnegative
19We converted the problem in (66) to a minimization problem by considering the negative of the objective function.
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Lagrange multipliers. At a stationary point, the following equalities hold for all q ∈ Q
∂
∂Σq
L(Σ,W, a,p,S∗) = −
Q∑
r=1
∂
∂Σq
f¯r(Σr,Wr, {S∗r,k}Kk=0) +
1
2p
Q∑
r=1
∂
∂Σq
(max{ar + pcr, 0})2 = 0
(69a)
∂
∂Wq
L(Σ,W, a,p,S∗) = −
Q∑
r=1
∂
∂Wq
f¯r(Σr,Wr, {S∗r,k}Kk=0) +
1
2p
Q∑
r=1
∂
∂Wq
(max{ar + pcr, 0})2 = 0
(69b)
where
∂
∂Σq
f¯r(Σr,Wr, {S∗r,k}Kk=0) =

HHqq(Mq + HqqΣqH
H
qq)
−1Hqq −
K∑
k=1
ρq,kGHq,kS
∗
q,kGq,k, r = q,
HHqr
(
(Mr + HrrΣrHHrr)
−1 − S∗r,0
)
Hqr +
K∑
k=1
ρr,kGHrk
(
(Me,r,k−1 − S∗r,k
)
Grk, r 6= q
(70)
∂
∂Wq
f¯r(Σr,Wr, {S∗r,k}Kk=0) =

HHqq
(
(Mq + HqqΣqHqq)−1 − S∗q,0
)
Hqq +
K∑
k=1
ρq,kGHqk
(
(Me,q,k)−1 − S∗q,k
)
Gqk, r = q,
HHqr
(
(Mr + HrrΣrHHrr)
−1 − S∗r,0
)
Hqr +
K∑
k=1
ρr,kGHrk
(
(Me,r,k)−1 − S∗r,k
)
Grk, r 6= q,
(71)
and
ρq,k =
eβϕe,q,k(Σq ,Wq ,S
∗
q,k)∑K
j=1 e
βϕe,q,j(Σq ,Wq ,S∗q,j)
. (72)
The second term in the RHS of (69a) is continuously differentiable w.r.t Σq when r = q [24, pp. 397].
Thus,
∂
∂Σq
(max{ar + pcr, 0})2=
{
2p(aq + pcq)Σq, r = q, aq + pcq> 0
0, ow.
(73)
and
∂
∂Wq
(max{ar + pcr, 0})2=
{
2p(aq + pcq)Wq, r = q, aq + pcq> 0
0, ow.
(74)
To satisfy the conditions in (69), we used gradient descent with a line search satisfying Armijo rule. The
details of the centralized algorithm is presented in Algorithm CSSM. The centralized nature of Algorithm
CSSM can be seen in Line 12, where the equalities in (69) are checked for all q ∈ Q and Line 11,
where the Armijo rule is applied. The convergence of this algorithm can be proved by extending the proof
of Theorem 1 in the paper and [25, Corollary 2], which is skipped here for the sake of brevity. Note
that Algorithm CSSM is sensitive to the initial values of [Σ,W]. Thus, we simulated this algorithm with
random initializations and averaged its performance over the total number of initializations.
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Algorithm CSSM4 The Centralized Secrecy Sum-rate Maximization Algorithm (CSSM)
Initialize: Σ(1)q , W(1)q , tr(Σ(1)q + W(1)q ) < Pq , ∀q, i = 0
1: repeat i = i+1 % superscript (i) indicates the iterations starting from here.
2: Compute S(i)q,k, ∀(q, k) ∈ Q×K, p = 1, aq = 0, ∀q, and st (Armijo step size)
3: repeat Set m = 1
4: repeat Set n = 1 % superscript (m) indicates the iterations starting from here.
5: Set[dΣq , dWq ]
T=−[ ∂
∂Σq
L(m)
T
, ∂
∂Wq
L(m)
T
], ∀q ⇒ d = {dΣq , dWq}Qq=1
6: Set [Σˆ, Wˆ] = [Σ(m),W(m)] + d
7: Set [Σ(m+1),W(m+1)] = [Σ(m),W(m)] + snt ([Σˆ, Wˆ]− [Σ(m),W(m)])
8: repeat % superscript (n) indicates the iterations starting from here.
9: sn+1t = st(s
n
t )
10: Set [Σ(m+1),W(m+1)] = [Σ(m),W(m)] + sn+1t ([Σˆ, Wˆ]− [Σ(m),W(m)])
11: until L(Σ(m+1),W(m+1), a(m+1), p, S(i)) < L(Σ(m),W(m), a(m), p, S(i)) + snt dT { ∂∂ΣqL
(m), ∂
∂Wq
L(m)}q
12: until ∂
∂Σq
L = ∂
∂Wq
L = 0, ∀q
13: aq = max{aq + pcq, 0}
14: p = p× u % u ≥ 1 increase the penalty.
15: until max{c1, . . . , cq} ≤ 0
16: until Convergence of L(Σ,W, a, p, S)
VIII. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we simulate and compare all the algorithms presented so far. In these simulations, we
set the noise power to 0 dBm. Q links as well as K eavesdroppers are randomly placed in a circle, namely,
the simulation region, with radius rcirc. The distance between the transmitter and the receiver of each link
is set to be a constant dlink = 10 m. The path-loss exponent is set to 2.5. For all simulated algorithms,
β = 5 (cf. (12)) and the termination criterion is set to when the normalized relative difference in each
link’s secrecy rate for two consecutive iterations is less than 10−3. For the QNE selection algorithms, we
set their parameters as follows: The step size matrix (i.e., γ′) is set such that γ′(i)j = γ0i
(−0.6), j = 1, . . . ,m,
where γ0 is a positive constant20, c = 0.08Im×m, and (j) = 1j .
A. Signaling Overhead and Running Time
While the distributed implementation of our proposed algorithms is now complete (cf. (45) and (60)),
we still need to make sure that the amount of coordination that each link has to do (to make each QNE
selection method possible) is reasonably low. That is, we need to check how much (if any) information a
link needs to know about other links’ corresponding channels and transmission attributes (i.e., covariance
matrices of information signal and AN) in order to execute one iteration of each algorithm.
Algorithm 1 presented in the previous manuscript only requires each link to measure the interference
at its receiver to perform the optimization in (51). By examining the iteration in (45) for each link,
where ∇Σq f¯q and ∇Wq f¯q are given in (21), we can deduce that Algorithm 2 requires the same amount of
coordination as Algorithm 1. The amount of coordination for Algorithm 3, however, depends on the choice
of the function Φ(x). Here, we compare all of the flavors of Algorithm 3 in terms of how much signaling
overhead they impose on the network. If maximizing sum-rate is the criterion, from (62) it can be seen
that during the computation of x((j)), at each iteration, the qth link, q ∈ Q, needs the values of received
signal, noise-plus-interference, and Sr,0 (r ∈ Q, r 6= q) of other links. Furthermore, the cross-channel
gains of the qth link with other (unintended) legitimate receivers (i.e., Hqr,∀r ∈ Q, r 6= q) should also be
20We found out that setting the maximum value of γ0 = 20000 brings the best performance for our algorithms.
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Fig. 2: A (clustered) MANET where two clusters (indiacted by green circle) of ad-hoc nodes are near
each other. Hence, one cluster might be interested in the ongoing communications of the other cluster.
available. Note that the cross-channel gains need not to be acquired multiple times at each iteration, as
they are fixed throughout the coherence time of the channels21. If the rth receiver sends training signals
to its corresponding transmitter, for (implicit) channel estimation, r ∈ Q, r 6= q, the channel gains Hqr can
be estimated by the qth transmitter using channel reciprocity. Moreover, it should be noted that while the
qth link, q = 1, . . . , Q, is using this criterion, it does not need to know any information about the channel
gains between other links and eavesdroppers. This feature makes this design criterion more favorable than
other criteria, which require obtaining the eavesdropping channel gains (i.e., Grk and Sr,k,∀r 6= q,∀k) of
all other links.
For the case of passive eavesdroppers, it does not seem difficult to derive the responses (or gradients)
while assuming the knowledge of only statistics of the eavesdropping channels. This can be done if in
(16) we replace the term ϕe,q,k with E [ϕe,q,k] where the expectation is w.r.t Gqk,∀q, k ∈ Q × K. Note
that including the expectation operator in the utilities, does not compromise the generality of any of the
analyses done in previous sections. Despite general difficulties in acquiring eavesdroppers’s CSI (ECSI),
some applications can be considered as practical examples where the knowledge of ECSI can be easily
captured. One such example is mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) where the ad-hoc links of one cluster
are interfering with one another, and can be considered as the legitimate links of our setup (See Fig.
2). On the other hand, the receivers of another cluster may try to overhear the communications of the
legitimate links in the nearby clusters. These receivers can be considered as the external eavesdroppers of
our setup. The clustering may have been done to ease the routing process in the network. It is possible that
the clustering algorithm requires the links to exchange their location, power, and (possibly) channel state
information (CSI). Hence, provided that the coherence time of the channels are long enough, each link
can maintain the CSI between itself and the links from another cluster. Hence, the ECSI can be known
to the links.
Another instance of our setup involves the downlink scenario of current cellular networks. Specifically,
assume that the communication of the BS of a cell is interfering with other nearby cells. Each BS-user
pair can be assumed as a legitimate link in our scenario. We assume that no MU-MIMO technique is done
in this scenario, so a BS is only communicating with one receiver (i.e., UE) at a given time. There might
be other idle users in such network that are interested in overhearing the current communications. We
can consider these idle users as the external eavesdroppers. It is possible that during the cell association
phase, the idle users –which are now the external eavesdroppers– exchange their location information (using
21Note that all aforementioned algorithms must run during the coherence time of the channels.
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known packets) with all the nearby BSs to eventually select a cell for their respective communications.
Hence, the BSs can extract the CSI between themselves and the external eavesdroppers and maintain it
(till the end of one coherence time) for use in PHY-layer security optimizations.
The issue of knowledge of ECSI has also been investigated in the recent literature. One example is
when Eve is acting as a reactive jammer. That is, after some eavesdropping on the current transmissions,
Eve injects her jamming signal to disrupt the ongoing communications. In such a case when jamming
happens, assuming that the jamming signal of Eves are previously known, the ECSI can be extracted
by the legitimate links using channel reciprocity. Moreover, in [26], it was shown that in a massive
MIMO scenario, a passive Eve cannot be very dangerous and must therefore be active and attack the
training phase. This active attack can make Eve exposed, and hence the legitimate links can acquire some
knowledge about ECSI. Recently, the authors in [27] proposed a method with which the legitimate nodes
can detect the passive eavesdropper from the local oscillator power leaked from its RF front end. Hence,
an approximation on the location of Eve can be acquired. Lastly, in some scenarios where the legitimate
nodes can detect the transmissions from Eves (e.g., active eavesdropping attacks), blind channel estimation
techniques can be exploited to capture ECSI [28], [29].
Lastly, regarding the computation of the proximal term τq as described by (54), through numerous
simulations we found that regardless of the topology of the network and the channel gains, the value
found for τq is always a vary small value (i.e., τq < 10−4). This does not compromise the validity of
inequality (54). However, in practice it seems that the transmit optimization game is always a monotone
VI problem. The derivation of inequality (54) was done because of the fact that it is not that obvious to
see the monotonicity of V I(FC,K).
It is also interesting to understand how the choice of design criterion changes the running time of our
proposed algorithm. To do this, we start from analyzing the computational complexity of Algorithm 1
and extend it to the analysis of our proposed algorithms.
1) Algorithm 1: In Line 2 of Algorithm 1, there is no need to compute every term of Mq and Me,q,k;
that is, in measuring the interference, only the aggregate value is needed. Hence, the complexity of Line
2 is equivalent to the complexity of calculating the covariance matrix of the received interference. More
specifically, at the receivers of legitimate links, the covariance matrix calculation of the NRq × 1 received
interference vector (i.e., Mq) yields a complexity of O(N2Rq). Similar computation is needed to obtain
Me,q,k, which has the complexity of O(
∑K
k=1N
2
ek). Line 5 of Algorithm 1 involves a matrix inversion
for Sq,0 and a matrix multiplication together with a matrix inversion for {Sq,k}Kk=1. The total complexity
of this line is O(∑Kk=1(NTqN2e,k + Ne,kN2Tq + N3e,k) + N3Rq). Computation of the gradients in Line 8
requires the computation of ϕe,q,k for all k ∈ K and (Mn,lq + HqqΣqHHqq)−1. Computation of ϕe,q,k for
all k ∈ K has the complexity of O(∑Kk=1NTqN2e,k + Ne,kN2Tq + N3e,k) due to matrix multiplications and
determinant calculations (cf. (10c)). The inverse of (Mn,lq + HqqΣqH
H
qq) yields an additional complexity
of O(N3Rq + N2RqNTq + NRqN2Tq). Notice that in calculating Mn,lq and Mn,le,q,k for all k ∈ K, an additional
computation for calculating HqqWn,lq H
H
qq and GqkW
n,l
q G
H
qk must be carried at each iteration of the PG
method (i.e., Line 6 of Algorithm 1), which respectively have complexities of O(N2RqNTq +NRqN2Tq) and
O(∑Kk=1NTqN2e,k +Ne,kN2Tq)). The other computations that were not mentioned in gradient derivation are
redundant and do not affect the general complexity. Apart from the gradient derivations, the Euclidean
projection also has its own complexity. The projection in (20) requires eigenvalue decomposition, and thus
has O(N3Tq) complexity. Adding all of the aforementioned computations, the complexity of Algorithm
1 for each user q is O
(
N3Rq +N
3
Tq
+N2RqNTq +NRqN
2
Tq
+K(NTqN
2
e,k +Ne,kN
2
Tq
+N3e,k)
)
or simply
O
(
N3Rq +N
3
Tq
+KN3e,k
)
. Note that one might also multiply this complexity by the amount of iterations
in the PG method and the AO process. Let the constants NPG and NAO denote the iterations taken
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in the PG method and AO process, respectively. Hence, the total complexity for each player q is22
O
(
NPGNAO
(
N3Rq +N
3
Tq
+KN3e,k
))
.
Algorithm 2: This algorithm can also be handled with the same complexity as Algorithm 1 with the
difference that the number of iterations in Algorithm 2 (i.e., repeating the loop at Line 1 of Algorithm
2) was shown in Fig. 5 (a) to be more than Algorithm 1, and hence a slower algorithm compared to
Algorithm 1. Let the convergence time of the loop in Line 1 of Algorithm 2 be NGR. Thus, the total
complexity of Algorithm 2 for each player q is O
(
NGR
(
N3Rq +N
3
Tq
+KN3e,k
))
.
Algorithm 3: In this algorithm, some additional calculations are generally required. For the criterion of
sum-rate maximization, the derivation of the gradients of Φ(x) are shown in (62), which has the additional
complexity of O(∑Qr=1
r 6=q
N3Rr +N
2
Rr
NTr +NRrN
2
Tr
). In the case of minimizing Eves’ rates as the QNE selec-
tion method, according to (64), computing Φ(x) would have the complexity of O(∑Qr=1
r 6=q
∑K
k=1NTrN
2
e,k +
Ne,kN
2
Tr
+ N3e,k). The convergence time of Algorithm 3 is generally different from that of Algorithm 2
due to the presence of criterion function in Algorithm 3. Setting NQNE as the convergence time of the
loop in Line 1 of Algorithm 3, the total complexity of Algorithm 3 is obtained as follows:
• Under sum-rate maximization as the QNE selection method, for every player q, the computational
complexity is
O
(
NQNENGR
(
N3Tq +Q(N
3
Rq +N
2
RqNTq +NRqN
2
Tq) +K(NTqN
2
e,k +Ne,kN
2
Tq +N
3
e,k)
))
,
or simply
O
(
NQNENGR
(
N3Tq +QN
3
Rq +KN
3
e,k
))
. (75)
• Under the minimization of Eves’ rates as the QNE selection method, for every player q, the complexity
is
O
(
NQNENGR
(
N3Tq +N
3
Rq +N
2
RqNTq +NRqN
2
Tq +QK(NTqN
2
e,k +Ne,kN
2
Tq +N
3
e,k)
))
,
or simply
O
(
NQNENGR
(
N3Tq +N
3
Rq +QKN
3
e,k
))
(76)
• Under the maximization of the secrecy sum-rate as the QNE selection method, for every player q,
the complexity is
O
(
NQNENGRQ
(
N3Rq +N
3
Tq +N
2
RqNTq +NRqN
2
Tq +K(NTqN
2
e,k +Ne,kN
2
Tq +N
3
e,k)
))
,
or simply
O
(
NQNENGRQ
(
N3Rq +N
3
Tq +KN
3
e,k
))
(77)
We also computed the actual running time of our algorithm using MATLAB on a commercial PC with the
following specifications: 1) 2.4 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU, 2) 8 GB 1333 MHz DDR3 RAM, 3) Mac OS X
El Capitan v. 10.11.6. We show the results in Fig. 3 for one iteration of Algorithm 3 while using different
criteria. Hence, in comparing these results with the theoretical derivations, one should skip the term NGR
and NQNE . Each point in the presented curves is averaged over the number of iterations and also over
22Notice that this result only makes sense when the QNE is unique. Otherwise if QNE is not unique, Algorithm 2 might not even converge,
taking the running time to infinity.
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Fig. 3: (a) Comparison of actual running time of proposed algorithms vs. (a) number of links, and (b)
number of Eves: rcirc = 30 m, K = 5, NTq = 5, Nrq = 5, Ne,k = 5, Pq = 40 dBm, ∀q, k.
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Fig. 4: Comparison of convergence trend of the proposed QNE selection methods: (8 links (Q = 8)
and 7 Eves (K = 7), rcirc = 30 m, NTq = 5, Nrq = 2 ∀q,Ne,k = 2 ∀k, dlink = 10 m, Pq = 40 dBm
)
.
100 channel realizations of a given (random) network topology23. The results in Fig. 3 (a) and Fig. 3
(b) show that the running time of the QNE selection when secrecy sum-rate is the criterion (i.e., Alg. 3
(Secrecy sum-rate)) is relatively higher than the other two QNE selection methods. It can be seen in Fig.
3 (a) that the difference in the computational complexity of Alg. 3 (Eves’ rates) (i.e., QNE selection when
minimizing Eves’ rates is the criterion) and Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate) appears to be in the slope of the
curves, which complies with theoretical derivations in (76) and (77). However, this difference becomes
23While we tried to generate the results that are as close as possible to the theoretical derivations, we ended up with non-smooth curves
at some points during this simulation. This is mainly due to the fact that in different channel realizations and different initial points, the
convergence behavior, and thus the total number of iterations, is not consistent. In order to tackle these problems and generate clean figures,
at some points we used linear regression of the actual complexity curve.
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Fig. 5: (a) Convergence of secrecy sum-rate when QNE is unique; (b) convergence of secrecy sum-rate
when multiple QNEs exist; (c) secrecy sum-rate vs. rcirc : Q = 8, K = 5, NTq = 5, Nrq = 2 ∀q,Ne,k =
2 ∀k, rcirc = (a) 100 m, (b) 20 m, Pq = (a) 20 dBm, (b) 30 dBm, (c) 40 dBm.
clear when the number of links/antennas are high enough24. It can be seen from Fig. 3 (b) that both Alg.
3 (Secrecy sum-rate) and Alg. 3 (Eves’ rates) have the same slope. This can be seen in the theoretical
derivation for the complexity of both QNE selection methods in (76) and (77), where for both criteria,
the complexity w.r.t K is a multiple QN3e,k. For the case of Alg. 3 (Sum-rate) (i.e., QNE selection when
maximizing sum-rate is the criterion) the complexity w.r.t K is only a multiple of N3e,k. The gap between
the Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate) and Alg. 3 (Eves’ rates) in Fig. 3 (b) is because of the additional complexity
of Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate), which is independent of the number eavesdroppers (i.e., K).
B. Effect of Initial Points
In general, the initial values for the covariance matrices of information and AN signals can affect the
results. Given the non-convexity of links’ optimization problems, and the fact that at a QNE links operate
at their stationary points, which are not necessarily unilaterally optimal, it is theoretically expected that
different initial values can make the algorithm converge to different stationary points, thus affecting the
final results. However, in our simulations, we did not see any significant variations in the secrecy sum-rate
when the initial values of information and AN covariance matrices are changed. For example, by changing
the initial values, for networks with 10 to 16 links, a maximum difference of 3 nats/sec/Hz and maximum
of 150 iterations until convergence were observed. The results can be seen in Fig. 4, where the simulated
convergence behavior of all three QNE selection methods is depicted for one channel realization. A point
at the nth iteration of a curve represents the resulting secrecy sum-rate of that particular QNE selection
method at the nth iteration, averaged over 100 random initial points. The corresponding 95% confidence
intervals are also shown. The tightness of the confidence intervals indicate that while the performance
varies when the initial points change, this variation is negligible. Note that in all of our simulations, we
considered random initializations for each channel realization of a given (random) network topology.
C. Overall Performance and Energy Efficiency
Fig. 5 (a) compares the three proposed algorithms in a channel realization for the case when the QNE
is unique. According to the uniqueness condition in Theorem 3, it is generally expected that if links are
far enough from each other, then the resulting QNE is likely to be unique. We simulate this scenario by
24Note that the theoretical derivations are derived for the worst case.
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Fig. 6: Comparison of (a) secrecy sum-rate, (b) sum-rate, (c) sum of eavesdroppers’ received rates vs.
number of links: rcirc = 30 m, K = 5, NTq = 5, Nrq = 2 ∀q,Ne,k = 2 ∀k, dlink = 10 m, Pq = 40 dBm.
increasing rcirc significantly. We consider the secrecy sum-rate as the measure of comparison between
the algorithms. It can be seen that all of the algorithms converge to almost the same point. This result
indicates the equivalence between the QNEs found by both Algorithms 1 and 2. Furthermore, it can be
concluded that the QNE selection algorithm with sum-rate as its design criterion (indicated by Alg. 3
(Sum-rate)) does not outperform Algorithm 2 when the QNE is unique (i.e., the condition in Theorem 3
is satisfied). That is, if the QNE is unique the QNE selection algorithms only have one QNE to choose
from. It should be noted that Algorithm 1 converges faster than other algorithms. This might be because
Algorithms 2 and 3 use smaller steps towards the QNE at each iteration.
Fig. 5 (b) compares the achieved secrecy sum-rate in a channel realization between Algorithm 2 and
different versions of Algorithm 3, indicated by “Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate)” when secrecy sum-rate is the
design criterion, “Alg. 3 (Eves’ rates)” when reducing Eves’ rates is the design criterion, and “Alg. 3
(Sum-rate)” when sum-rate is the design criterion. Furthermore, due to the existence of multiple QNEs,
Algorithm 2 is oscillating between QNEs and never converges even after 70 iterations25. We increased
the number of iterations to 1000, but did not see the convergence of Algorithm 2. However, all of the
versions of Algorithm 3 converge to a QNE26.
Fig. 5 (c) shows the secrecy sum-rate resulting from different algorithms vs. rcirc. For Algorithm 2,
we limit the iterations to 100. For Algorithm 3, we limit the iterations of the inner loop (i.e., line 3 in
Algorithm 3) and the outer loop (i.e., line 1 in Algorithm 3) to 50 and 3, respectively. Each point in the
figure is the result of averaging over 50 random network topologies, where in each topology, 200 channel
realizations are simulated and averaged. It can be seen that when rcirc is small (i.e., high interference),
Alg. 3 (Sum-rate) and Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate) have higher secrecy sum-rate than Algorithm 2. This is
due to the fact that the myopic maximization of secrecy rates in Algorithm 2 is not guaranteed to converge
to a QNE. Moreover, it can be seen that in Alg. 3 (Eves’ rates), we cannot increase the secrecy rate as
much as other versions of Algorithm 3. This is due to the fact that in minimizing the received rate at
eavesdroppers, too much AN power creates unwanted interference on legitimate receivers, preventing any
improvement on the secrecy sum-rate.
Fig. 6 (a) compares the secrecy sum-rate of Algorithms 2 and 3 for different number of links. Alg. 3
25Recall that convergence of Algorithm 2 is tied to the uniqueness of the QNE. Furthermore, due to the similarity in the behavior of
Algorithms 1 and 2, we only showed Algorithm 2 in subsequent simulations.
26The result in Fig. 5 (b) should not be confused with the previous simulation in Fig. 5 (a). In fact, equal secrecy sum-rate for all of the
algorithms happen only when QNE is unique (i.e., the condition in Theorem 3 is satisfied). However, Fig. 5 (b) is showing results when the
condition in Theorem 3 is not likely to be satisfied.
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Fig. 7: Comparison of (a) total power (b) total power of information signal (c) total power of AN vs.
number of links: rcirc = 30 m, K = 5, NTq = 5, Nrq = 2 ∀q,Ne,k = 2 ∀k, dlink = 10 m, Pq = 40 dBm.
(Secrecy sum-rate) and Alg. 3 (Sum-rate) consistently outperform Algorithm 2 in terms of secrecy sum-
rate (Fig. 6 (a)) and sum-rate (Fig. 6 (b)), and Alg. 3 (Eves’ rates) does not result in a secrecy sum-rate
as high as the other two flavors of Algorithm 3. As shown in Fig. 6 (c), using Alg. 3 (Eves’ rates) slightly
reduces sum of Eves’ received rates by increasing interference at Eves, but this directly affects legitimate
transmissions as well. Furthermore, Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate) does not have a significant advantage over
Alg. 3 (Sum-rate). Another interesting point is that Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate) has slightly higher sum-
rate and higher leaked rate compared to Alg. 3 (Sum-rate). Hence, the performance of Alg. 3 (Secrecy
sum-rate) is not necessarily a combination of Alg. 3 (Sum-rate) and Alg. 3 (Eves’ rates), but rather a
good tradeoff point. Lastly, it can be seen that the proposed algorithms have lower secrecy sum-rates
compared to CSSM. We conjecture that this might be due to the fact that CSSM has a larger solution
space compared to our methods. Note that the solution space of CSSM may contain some points that are
not necessarily the QNEs of the game, whereas both Algorithms 2 and 3 can only converge to QNEs of
the game. The difference between Algorithms 2 and 3 is that Algorithm 3 selects the best QNE (according
to a criterion), but Algorithm 2 does not. As can be seen in Fig. 6 (a), for the case of 16 links, the loss
of Algorithm 3 compared to CSSM is less than 25% when either secrecy sum-rate or sum-rate is the
criterion for the QNE selection phase of Algorithm 3. Despite this loss, using Algorithm 3 facilitates not
only a distributed implementation, but also the flexibility in the amount of coordination. The latter gives
us freedom to keep the coordination as low as possible. Neither of these features are available in CSSM.
In Fig. 7 (a)–(c) the power consumption of different algorithms are compared. The total power in Fig.
7 (a)–(c) is normalized w.r.t the total power budget
∑
q Pq. Generally, Alg. 3 (Sum-rate) is the most
energy efficient algorithm. Both Alg. 2 and Alg. 3 (Eves’ rates) perform poorly in energy efficiency as
the increase in the power of AN creates interference at other legitimate receivers. This makes the links
to spend even more power on the information signal which eventually leads to neither a high sum-rate
nor a high secrecy sum-rate. Moreover, the increase in the power of AN seems to be more significant
in Alg. 3 (Eves’ rates), as the design criterion forces the users to carelessly increase the interference at
Eves. Lastly, Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate) and Alg. 3 (Sum-rate) decrease the power of AN as the number
of links increases because as the links abound, they automatically create additional interference at Eves.
Hence, the links do not spend more power on AN.
Fig. 8 shows that as the number of eavesdroppers in the network increases, Alg. 3 (Sum-rate) and
Alg. 3 (Secrecy sum-rate) outperform Algorithm 2 in terms of secrecy sum-rate, and Alg. 3 (Eves’ rates)
still achieves a low secrecy sum-rate. Overall, in these simulations, maximizing sum-rate as a design
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Fig. 8: Comparison of secrecy sum-rate vs. number of Eves:
rcirc = 30 m, Q = 8, NTq = 5, Nrq = Ne,k = 2, Pq = 40 dBm
criterion seems to be the best to increase the secrecy sum-rate because other proposed criteria cannot add
significant improvements despite requiring more extensive signaling between the links (e.g., the knowledge
of all eavesdropping channel gains). Lastly, minimizing Eves’ rates as the design criterion although brings
poor performance to the QNE selection, it gives us valuable insights on the importance of interference
management such that if it is overlooked, the secrecy sum-rate in the network can be severely decreased.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
We designed a game theoretic secure transmit optimization for a MIMO interference network with
several MIMO-enabled eavesdroppers. We proposed three algorithms to increase secrecy sum-rate. In the
first algorithm, the links myopically optimize their transmission until a quasi-Nash equilibrium (QNE) is
reached. Because of the inferior performance of first algorithm in case of multiple QNEs, we designed
the second algorithm based on the concept of variational inequality. The second algorithm enables us to
analytically derive convergence conditions, but achieves the same secrecy sum-rate as the first algorithm.
To increase the secrecy sum-rate, we proposed the third algorithm in which the links can select the best
QNE according to a certain design criterion. Simulations showed that not every criterion is good for the
performance improvement. Specifically, reducing co-channel interference is a better criterion compared
to increasing interference at the eavesdroppers to improve secrecy sum-rate.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Let (Σ∗q,W
∗
q, {S∗q,k}Kk=0) denote the limit point of AO iterations found in Line 10 of Algorithm 1 for
the qth link, q ∈ Q. As mentioned earlier, problem (51) is convex w.r.t either (Σq,Wq) or {Sq}Kk=0. Then,
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recalling the minimum principle in (24), we have the following27:
Xq = [Σ
∗
q
T ,W∗q
T ]T , Zq = [Σq
T ,WqT ]T ,∇Zq f¯q(Σ∗q,W∗q, {S∗q,k}Kk=0) =
[−(∇Σq f¯q)T ,−(∇Wq f¯q)T ]T ,
(78a)〈
Zq −Xq,∇Zq f¯q(Σ∗q,W∗q, {S∗q,k}Kk=0)
〉 ≥ 0, ∀(Σq,Wq) ∈ Fq, (78b)〈
Sq,k − S∗q,k,∇Sq,k f¯q(Σ∗q,W∗q, {S∗q,k}Kk=0)
〉 ≥ 0, ∀Sq,k  0, ∀k ∈ K. (78c)
It should be noted that for a given (Σ∗q,W
∗
q), the value of {S∗q,k}Kk=0 are uniquely determined (cf. (11b)
and (11c)). Hence, using Danskin’s theorem [24], the function f¯q(Σq,Wq,
{
S∗q,k
}K
k=0
) is differentiable w.r.t
(Σq,Wq), and inequality (78b) holds28. Moreover, it can be verified that
∇Σq f¯q(Σ∗q,W∗q,
{
S∗q,k
}K
k=0
) = ∇ΣqR¯s,q(Σ∗q,Wq∗), (79)
∇Wq f¯q(Σ∗q,W∗q,
{
S∗q,k
}K
k=0
) = ∇WqR¯s,q(Σ∗q,Wq∗) (80)
where R¯s,q is the smooth approximation of secrecy rate mentioned in (13). Then, according to (79),〈
Zq −Xq,∇ZR¯s,q(Σ∗q,W∗q)
〉 ≤ 0, ∀(Σq,Wq) ∈ Fq (81)
where ∇ZR¯s,q(Σ∗q,W∗q) =
[
(∇ΣqR¯s,q)T , (∇WqR¯s,q)T
]T . Hence, (Σ∗q,W∗q) is the optimal solution to
maximize
Zq
〈
Zq −Xq,∇ZR¯s,q(Σ∗q,W∗q)
〉
s.t. Zq ∈ Fq. (82)
Hence, (Σ∗q,W
∗
q) must satisfy the K.K.T conditions of (82), which can be written as
∇ΣqR¯s,q(Σ∗q,W∗q)− ζqI + Ξq,1 = 0 (83a)
∇WqR¯s,q(Σ∗q,W∗q)− ζqI + Ξq,2 = 0 (83b)
ζq(tr(Σ∗q + W
∗
q)− Pq) = 0,Σ∗qΞq,1 = 0,W∗qΞq,2 = 0 (83c)
ζq ≥ 0,Ξq,1  0,Ξq,2  0. (83d)
where ζq, Ξq,1, and Ξq,2 are Lagrange multipliers. Therefore, the stationary point of AO iterations satisfies
the K.K.T conditions of (13).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
To prove the existence of the QNE, we use the following theorem:
Theorem 5. [11, Corollary 2.2.5] For a mapping F : Q → RN that is continuous on the compact and
convex set Q ⊆ RN , the solution set for V I(F,Q) is nonempty and compact.
The objective in (51) is continuously differentiable on its domain, making FR continuous. Furthermore,
the set K is a compact convex set because it is the Cartesian product of compact convex sets (i.e., players’
strategy sets). Hence, KR, the real-vector version of K, is a convex set. Due to the presence of power
constraints, the strategy set of each player is compact, then the set KR is also compact. Thus, according to
Theorem 5, the solution set to the VI in (40) is nonempty, meaning that the QNE in the proposed smooth
game exists.
27AO iterations converge to a stationary point of (51) [5, Section IV-B], [25, Corollary 2].
28Similar reasoning for f¯q(Σ∗q ,W∗q , Sq,k) can be used to justify the inequality in (78c).
August 7, 2018 DRAFT
SIYARI et al.: SECURE TRANSMISSIONS USING ARTIFICIAL NOISE IN MIMO WIRETAP INTERFERENCE CHANNEL: A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH 33
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We first introduce following definition:
Definition 2. [18, Definition 26] Considering the complex VI in (25), with FC(Z) : K → CN ′×N , K ⊆
CN ′×N being a continuously R−differentiable function and K being a convex set that has a non-empty
interior. The augmented Jacobian matrix for FC(Z), namely, JFC(Z), is defined as follows29:
JFC(Z) , 1
2
[
DZF
C(Z) DZ∗F
C(Z)
DZ(F
C(Z)∗) DZ∗(FC(Z)∗)
]
(84)
where DZ(FC(Z)) ,
∂ vec(FC(Z))
∂ vec(Z)T is a N
′N × N ′N derivative matrix, DZ∗FC(Z)∗ = DZ(FC(Z)∗, and
DZ
(
FC(Z)∗
)
= DZ∗F
C(Z).
Using this definition, the following proposition holds for V I(FC,K).
Proposition 3. [18, Proposition 27] For the V I(FC,K) defined in Definition 1, it holds that:
• FC is monotone on K if and only if JFC(Z) is Augmented Positive Semidefinite (APSD) on K. That
is, for all Y ∈ CN ′×N and Z ∈ K,
[vec(Y ∗)T , vec(Y )T ]JFC(Z)[vec(Y )T , vec(Y ∗)T ]T ≥ 0 (85)
Therefore, V I(FC,K) is called a monotone VI and has a (possibly empty) convex solution set.
• If JFC(Z) is Augmented Positive Definite (APD) on K, then FC is strictly monotone on K. JFC(Z)
is APD if the inequality in (85) is strict. Hence, V I(F,Q) is a strictly monotone VI and has at most
one solution (if there exists any).
• FC is strongly monotone on K with constant cs > 0 if and only if JFC(Z) is uniformly APD on K
with constant cs/2. That is, for all Y ∈ CN ′×N and Z ∈ K, there exists a constant cs such that
[vec(Y ∗)T , vec(Y )T ]JFC(Z)[vec(Y )T , vec(Y ∗)T ]T ≥ cs||Y ||2F (86)
where ||.||F is the Frobenius norm. Hence, V I(F,Q) is a strongly monotone VI and has a unique
solution.
We write the augmented Jacobian matrix for FC(Σ,W) according to (84). Let DZFC(Z) be defined
as
DZF
C(Z) ,
 DZ1F
C
1 (Z1) . . . DZQF
C
1 (Z1)
... . . .
...
DZ1F
C
Q(ZQ) . . . DZQF
C
Q(ZQ)
 (87)
where DZlF
C
q (Zq) for all q, l ∈ 1, ..., Q2 is defined as
DZlF
C
q (Zq) ,
[
DΣl(−∇Σq f¯q) DWl(−∇Σq f¯q)
DΣl(−∇Wq f¯q) DWl(−∇Wq f¯q)
]
, (88)
and DZ∗FC(Z) = DZ(FC(Z)∗ = 0 (cf. (34)). Thus the matrix JFC becomes a block diagonal matrix.
For a QNE to be unique, the matrix JFC has to satisfy inequality (85) with strict inequality. Since the
game is proved to have at least one QNE (using Theorem 2), and since a strictly monotone VI has at
most one solution (if there exists any), then the strict monotonicity of the resulting VI from the game is
sufficient to prove the uniqueness of QNE. The strict monotonicity property requires JFC to be APD. In
order to satisfy this condition, we only need DZFC(Z) to be Positive Definite (PD). Given FC in (34),
29For the case of K having a possibly empty interior, the equivalent conidtion in [18, Proposition 28] can be used.
August 7, 2018 DRAFT
SIYARI et al.: SECURE TRANSMISSIONS USING ARTIFICIAL NOISE IN MIMO WIRETAP INTERFERENCE CHANNEL: A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH 34
the entries of DZlF
C
q (Zq) are:
DΣl(−∇Σq f¯q) ,
K∑
k=1
(
Λq,l,k ⊗GHqkSq,kGqk
)−Ψ∗ql ⊗Ψql. (89)where:
Ψql , −HHqq
(
Mq + HqqΣqHHqq
)−1Hql, (90)
Λq,l,k ,

βeβϕe,q,k(∑K
k′=1 e
βϕe,q,k′
)2GHlk (Sq,k −M−1e,q,k)Glk − βeβϕe,q,k(∑K
k′=1 e
βϕe,q,k′
)2 K∑
k′=1
(
eβϕe,q,k′GHlk
(
Sq,k −M−1e,q,k
)
Glk
)
, l 6= q,
βeβϕe,q,k(∑K
k′=1 e
βϕe,q,k′
)2GHqkSq,kGqk − βeβϕe,q,k(∑K
k′=1 e
βϕe,q,k′
)2 K∑
k′=1
(
eβϕe,q,k′GHqk′Sq,k′Gqk′
)
, l = q,
(91)
and the operator ⊗ represents the Kronecker product. Furthermore,
DWl(−∇Σq f¯q) , DΣl(−∇Wq f¯q) =
K∑
k=1
(
Ωq,l,k ⊗GHqkSq,kGqk
)−Ψ∗ql ⊗Ψql (92)
where ∀(l, q) ∈ {1, . . . , Q}2,
Ωq,l,k ,
βeβϕe,q,k(∑K
k′=1 e
βϕe,q,k′
)2GHlk (Sq,k −M−1e,q,k)Glk − βeβϕe,q,k(∑K
k′=1 e
βϕe,q,k′
)2 K∑
k′=1
(
eβϕe,q,k′GHlk′
(
Sq,k′ −M−1e,q,k′
)
Glk′
)
,
(93)
and the first inequality in (92) holds because both of the derivatives DWl(−∇Σq f¯q) and DΣl(−∇Wq f¯q)
are continuous which implies the symmetry of the Hessian matrix (i.e., equality of mixed derivatives).
Lastly,
DWl(−∇Wq f¯q) ,
K∑
k=1
(
Ωq,l,k ⊗GHqkSq,kGqk − Ωq,l,k ⊗GHqkM−1e,q,kGqk + piq,l,k ⊗ piq,l,k
)−Ψ∗ql ⊗Ψql
(94)
where
piq,l,k , GHqkM−1e,q,kGlk. (95)
Recalling equations (87) and (88) again, to prove DZFC(Z) is PD, we rely on the generalized Gerschgorin
circle theorem [22]. Specifically, for a block matrix A in which the blocks Aij, (i, j) = 1, . . . ,M are
N ×N matrices with complex entries, define the matrix norm ||| • ||| in CN×Nas follows:
|||Aij||| , sup
x∈CN
||Aijx||
||x|| . (96)
where || • || is a vector norm on CN . Using the Gerschgorin circle theorem, every eigenvalue λ of A
satisfies
|||(Aii − λI)−1|||−1 ≤
M∑
k=1
k 6=i
|||Ai,k||| (97)
for at least one 1 ≤ i ≤M , where |||A−1|||−1 , infx∈CN ||Ax||||x|| , and I is the identity matrix.
Proposition 4. [22] If the diagonal block Aii, i = 1, . . . ,M of the block matrix A are nonsingular and
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if
|||A−1i,i |||−1 ≥
M∑
k=1
k 6=i
|||Ai,k|||, i = 1, . . . ,M (98)
for norm ||| • ||| in CN×N (where |||A−1i,i |||−1 = inf
x∈CN
||Aijx||
||x|| ), then A is a diagonally dominant matrix.
Also if the diagonal blocks are PSD, the condition in (98) is sufficient for the matrix A to be PSD.
We can use the above Gerschgorin circle theorem, Proposition 3, and Proposition 4 on DZFC(Z)
defined in (87) to obtain the set of conditions with which the augmented Jacobian matrix JFC is APSD.
We also set the norm |||•||| to be the spectral norm. (i.e., |||A|||2 =
√
λmax (AHA) where λmax(•) denotes
the spectral radius of a matrix). Therefore, for JFC to satisfy the condition in (98), we must have [22,
Chapter 6.1]
|λq,min| ≥
Q∑
q=1
q 6=l
|||DZlFCq (Zq)|||2, q = 1, . . . , Q (99)
where λq,min is the smallest eigenvalue of DZqFCq (Zq). Using the strict inequality to (99) –as required
by the strict monotonicity– and since the diagonal blocks of DZFC(Z) are already PSD (i.e., λq,min ≥ 0
due to concavity of qth player’s utility to (Σq,Wq)), then the condition in (99) changes to
λq,min >
Q∑
q=1
q 6=l
|||DZlFCq (Zq)|||2, q = 1, . . . , Q (100)
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